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The I96O's marked a watershed for the criminal justice system. 1 In
such areas as search and seizure, 2 right to counsel 3 and the privilege against
self-incrimination, 4 the federal courts first defined substantive constitutional rights and then imposed them upon disinclined functionaries at the
state level. At first, these innovations raised thorny questions of constitutional interpretation about the rights involved, but, as is especially visible
in the search and seizure area, the debate more recently has focused on the
remedy chosen by the Supreme Court for enforcing these rights against the
states.' This pattern of escalating federal involvement in the criminal
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I. Se L. LEVY, AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1974).
See gmrally A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1970); A. Cox,
THE WARREN COURT (1968); P. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 74-82 (1970).

2. See, e.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); United States v. Katz, 389 U.S.
347 (1967); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964);Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
4. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. I
(964). Other important cases include Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double
jeopardy); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969) (right to speedy trial); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145 (1968) (right to jury trial); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)
(confrontation of witnesses); In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967) (juvenile proceedings); Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (963) (habeas corpus).
5. Compare, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (the 14th amendment's due process
guarantee requires that state law enforcement officials conform to the fourth amendment's requirement of reasonable searches and seizures, and state courts must use the exclusionary rule to
enforce that guarantee), with Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976), and United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (criticizing the efficacy and desirability of the exclusionary rule as
a remedy for unconstitutional search and seizure). See generally Robbins & Sanders, The Habeas
Corpus Trilogy of 1963: How to Kill Two Thirds With One Stone, 15 AM. CRIM. L. REV. - (1977).
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justice system was not limited to criminal investigatory procedures and
protection of the rights of the accused at trial. Breaking with prior law and
practice, 6 federal courts also started reviewing individual prisoner petitions alleging violation of constitutional rights, and, by the end of the
decade, they began intervening in the policies and affairs of state correctional facilities. 7 In this area of criminal procedure as well as in those
surrounding the investigatory and trial stages, the more controversial
innovations have begun to shift from definition of the right to more
detailed explication of the remedy required once a violation of the right has
been found.
Pugh v. Locke, 8 a recent decision of the Federal District Court for the
Middle District of Alabama, exemplifies this new remedial activism on the
part of the federal judiciary that results when the eighth amendment's9
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is given broad scope.
Thus, Pugh's significance begins with its uniquely clear and expansive
holding that the confinement conditions facing the aggregate prison
population of a state could violate the eighth amendment. This extension
of the constitutional mandate to cover overall conditions of confinement,
coupled with the finding in Pugh that Alabama's prison system violated
that mandate, required Chief Judge Johnson to enlarge the scope of the
ultimate federal remedy for unconstitutional punishment. He ordered
Alabama prison officials to conform to minutely detailed minimum constitutional standards for prison conditions, and he undertook to monitor
the entire prison system to assure compliance. No prior federal court had
involved itself s deeply in the administration of a state prison system.
Given the generally deplorable conditions in many correctional
facilities in the United States, 10 this development poses serious and
6. See text accompanying notes 42-45 infra.
7. See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 33o F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd inpart and
rev'd in part, 46o F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Holt v. Sarver, 309
F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 197o), aff'd, 442 F.2d 3 04 (8th Cir. 1971);Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F.
Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
8. 4o6 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), notice ofappealfiled, Civ. No. 7 4-203-N (M.D. Ala.
Apr. 5, 1976). The case was reported in the advance sheets asJamesv. Wallace and commonly is
referred to by that name. In the bound volume of the Federal Supplement, however, the case is
reported as Pugh v. Locke. In the earlier case of James v. Wallace, 382 F. Supp. 1177 (M.D. Ala.
1974), the same court denied the defendant state officials' motion to dismiss on grounds that the
complaint, alleging first that the prisoners had been refused an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves, second that they arbitrarily and capriciously had been assigned to units that had no
treatment facilities for mental or physical disabilities, and finally that unreasonable restrictions
had been placed on their visitation rights, stated a claim upon which relief could be granted. For a
discussion of Pugh, see text accompanying notes 11-27 infra.
9. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
io. "There are today about 400 institutions for adult felons in this country, ranging from
some of the oldest and largest prisons in the world to forestry camps for 30 or 40 trusted inmates.
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important legal issues for aggrieved inmates, prison officials and public
policymakers. Moreover, in light of the questions of federalism raised by a
United States district court's revamping of an entire state prison system,
the decision has even broader implications for the federal adjudication of
civil rights generally. This Article examines the doctrinal and remedial
alternatives suggested by the prison cases, and particularlyPugh v. Locke, in
light of recent Supreme Court restrictions on federal court intervention in
state administrative affairs. After a brief discussion of Pugh and of the
federalism issues surrounding that case, the Article turns to the body of law
interpreting the eighth amendment in the prison context and then to the
specific remedies ordered in Pugh in order to implement that law. Finally,
the Article concludes with-an examination of the propriety of federal
judicial supervision of state prison systems, both in terms of federalism
concerns and in light of the more traditional debate over the appropriate
role of the judiciary in a democratic society.
I. Pugh v. Locke-A SYNOPSIS
An understanding of the innovations in the constitutional theory and
the intrusiveness of the remedial program developed in Pugh requires a
review of the case and its holding. The plaintiffs in Pugh, present and
future inmates of Alabama state penal institutions," sued, in their individual and official capacities, the Governor of Alabama, the Commissioner, Deputy Commissioner and members of the Alabama Board of
Corrections, and the wardens of two state correctional facilities, 12 seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief for deprivation of rights under the eighth
and I 4 th amendments.' 3 The court's memorandum opinion consisted
Some are grossly understaffed and underequipped--conspicuous products of public indifference.
Overcrowding and idleness are the salient features of some, brutality and corruption of a few
others. Far too few are well organized and adequately funded. Juvenile institutions tend to be
better, but also vary greatly. The local jails and workhouses that handle most misdemeanants are
generally the most inadequate in every way." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT
AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: CORRECTIONS 4 (1967).
In fact, the term "correctional" may be a misnomer. For discussion of this issue, see, e.g.,
Robbins, Learningby Redoing (Book Review), 77 COLUM. L. REV. 153 (1977); Robbins, Brothers
of Gulag (Book Review), 62 VA. L. REV. 462, 464-65, 468 & n.36 (1976).
11. 4o6 F. Supp. at 32 x. The suit was brought as a class action under FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)
and 2 3 (b)(2).
12. 4o6 F. Supp. at 321.
13. The action was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (970): "Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects,
or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress."
The Supreme Court applied the eighth amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment to the states through the 14th amendment in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o (1962).
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primarily of a litany of undisputed facts concerning the conditions in the
state's four principal correctional facilities. 14 Foremost among these facts
was severe overcrowding, which the court found to be "primarily responsible for . . . all the other ills of Alabama's penal system."' 5 For example,
the lack of adequate facilities mandated the total abnegation of a prisoner
classification system, 1 6 so that the io percent of the prison population
known to be psychotic1 7 as well as many others known to be violently
disposed were dispersed throughout the several prisons. 1 8 The court also
found that the physical plants, electrical wiring, heating, plumbing, and
ventilation were in disrepair and that the decrepit facilities promoted the
"gross infestation" of vermin. 9 Food service equipment and storage and
preparation techniques were unsanitary, and personal hygiene among
inmates presented "an insurmountable problem." 20 Further, overworked
prison personnel contributed considerably to "the rampant violence and
jungle atmosphere." 2 ' Finally, the court characterized the vocational,
educational, work, and recreational programs available to Alabama state
prisoners as "totally inadequate to provide reasonable opportunities for
rehabilitation-or even to prevent physical and mental deterioration--of
most of the inmate population." 2 2 On the basis of these findings, the court
concluded that "[t]he living conditions
in Alabama prisons constitute[d]
23
cruel and unusual punishment."
In response to the ubiquitous ills that plagued the Alabama prisons, the
court devised an equally all-encompassing remedy. First, it promulgated a
detailed set of "Minimum Constitutional Standards for Inmates of
14. 406 F. Supp. at 322-28. The cases were submitted on evidence offered at trial, as well
as on depositions, briefs and more than i,ooo stipulated facts. See id. at 322.
15; Id. at 323. The court noted that at the time of trial some 3,550 inmates were incarcerated in the four major Alabama penal institutions designed to house a maximum of 2,307
inmates. Id. at 322. Accord, McCray v. Sullivan, 399 F. Supp. 271 (S.D. Ala. i975); see notes
103-05 & 166-70 infra and accompanying texts.

i6.

4o6 F. Supp. at 324-25.
17. Id. at 324.

18. Id. See also notes io6-o9 infra and accompanying text.
19. 4o6 F. Supp. at 323. See also H. CHARRIERE, PAPILLON (1970).
20. 4o6 F. Supp. at 323. A United States public health officer toured the four main

Alabama facilities and found them "wholly unfit for human habitation according to virtually
every criterion used for evaluation by public health inspectors." Id. at 323-24. This officer
testified that, if such facilities were under his jurisdiction, he would recommend that they be
closed and condemned "as an imminent danger to the health of the individuals exposed to them."
Id. at 324. See notes 126 & 169 infra.
21. 4o6 F. Supp. at 325.
22.

Id. at 326.

23. Id. at 329. The proffered defense that the conditions of confinement were directly
related to inadequate funding by the state legislature was summarily rejected. Id. at 330-3 1. See
note 93 infra.
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Alabama Penal System" 24 and ordered the defendants to report to the court
in 6 months concerning "their programs in the implementation of each and
every standard."' 2 s The court also ordered the state to form a Human
Rights Committee for the Alabama Prison System to monitor the implementation of the standards. 2 6 Finally, the court placed the defendant state
officials "on notice that failure to comply with the minimum standards
. . . will necessitate the closing of those several prison facilities herein

found to be unfit for human confinement." 2 7 Taken together, these
requirements constituted the most ambitious federal court intervention in
the field of corrections.
II.

COUNTER TRENDS NEW AND OLD:

PROBLEMS OF FEDERALISM AND EXPERTISE

Although federal courts previously had threatened to close penal
facilities and had required prison officials to report on their continuing
progress, 28 none before Pugh had declared, for example, that the Constitution guarantees each inmate 6o square feet of living space or a sink with hot
and cold running water in his cell. 29 And few courts had divested state
officials so completely ofprimary authority for running a state institution.
Not so long ago, however, the Pugh court's remedy might have been
viewed as a logical step toward the protection of federally guaranteed rights
against recalcitrant state officials. The school desegregation cases had set
ample precedent for federal intervention in activities traditionally left
within the province of the states, 3 6 and the Supreme Court not only had
permitted but also had mandated imaginative expansion of federal equity
powers to deal with deprivations of constitutional rights.3 1
Recently, however, the Supreme Court has reversed this trend and
shown a new concern with principles of federalism in dealing with state
officials. This new concern began in 1971 with Younger v. Harris,3 2 which
24. 406 F. Supp. at 332. See text accompanying notes 145-70 infra for a discussion of the
promulgated standards.
25. 406 F. Supp. at 332.
a6. Id. at 331.
27.

Id.

28. See, e.g., Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 133, 142-43 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
29. 406 F. Supp. at 332. See notes 166-70 infra and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Brown v. Board ofEduc.,
349 U.S. 294 (1955) (Brown II).
31. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. I, 28 (1971)
("[T]he remedy for such segregation may be administratively awkward, inconvenient and even
bizarre in some situations and may impose burdens on some; but all awkwardness and inconvenience cannot be avoided in the interim period when remedial adjustments are being made to
eliminate the dual school system."); note 49 infra.
32.

40! U.S. 37 (X97).
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prohibited federal courts from enjoining pending state criminal prosecutions under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. 3 3 Since Younger, the
Court has extended its prohibition of federal court interference in state
courts to cases involving state civil proceedings that are similar to criminal
prosecutions, such as state nuisance actions against pornographic
theaters. 3 4 Most recently, in Rizzo v. Goode, 3 the Court held that a federal
district court exceeded its authority in requiring that the Philadelphia
Police Department draft and submit guidelines for dealing with civilian
complaints of constitutional violations. In so doing, the Court noted that
"the principles of federalism which play such an important part in govern36
ing the relationship between federal courts and state governments"
govern requests for injunctions not only against state judicialproceedings
but against "those in charge of. . .an agency of state or local governments" 3 7 as well.
Although Rizzo probably rests most firmly on the Court's alternative
holding that no cause of action had been shown under section 1983,38 its
broad federalism dicta portend a Court bent on limiting federal intervention against state officials. Moreover, unlike the Pugh court's order,
containing detailed instructions and requiring the establishment of a
committee with broad powers of oversight, 3 9 the remedy overturned in
Rizzo merely ordered the police department to draft and implement
4
guidelines. 0
Rizzo's concern for principles of federalism may have additional vitality
in the prison context in light of the hands-off approach 41 that traditionally
has precluded federal courts from entertaining state prisoners' allegations
of unconstitutional treatment. 42 The concept was predicated upon the
belief that the inmate was a "slave of the State" 4 3 who had no rights for the
33. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (197o), quoted in note 13 supra.
34. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975). See Bartels, Avoiding a Comity of Errors:
A' Model for Adjudicating Federal Civil Rights Suits that "Interfere" with State Civil Proceedings, 29
STAN. L. REV. 27 (1976).
35. 432 U.S. 362 (1976).
36. Id. at 380.
37. Id. See Note, Rizzo v. Goode: Federal Remedies for Police Misconduct, 62 VA. L. REV.
1259 (1976).
38. 432 U.S. at 377. See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 238 (1976).
39- See notes 147-52 infra and accompanying text.
40. Council of Orgs. on Phila. Police Accountability and Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357 F.
Supp. 1289, 1321 (E.D. Pa. 1973),affdsubnom. Goode v. Rizzo, 5o6 F.2d 542 ( 3 d Cir. I974),
rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
41. See Comment, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique ofJudicial Refusal to Revieu the
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 5o6 (1963). See also Hirshkop & Millemann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA. L. REv. 795 (1969); Note, ConstitutionalRights of Prisoners:The
Developing Law, i 1o U. PA. L. REV. 985 (1962).
42. See, e.g., Bethea v. Crouse, 417 F.2d 504, 5o5-o6 (ioth Cit. 1969) (historical discussion); Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 859 (954); Stroud v.
Swope, 187 F.2d 85o (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829 (1951).
43. Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62 Va. (21 Gratt.) 790, 796 (1871); see Exparte Pickens,
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sovereign to violate. The doctrine retains modern vitality in part because of
the judiciary's natural reluctance to intervene in affairs of internal prison
administration that appear to involve a high degree of expertise and
discretion." Moreover, cognizant of the principles of separation of powers
and federalism, the federal courts even today view corrections as a matter
primarily of executive-and in cases involving state prisons, of stateconcern. 4 5 The passage in the post-bellum period of the Federal Civil
Rights Acts 4 6 provided a potential mandate for judicial intervention, thus
weakening the underpinnings ofthe hands-off doctrine. But a century later
federal courts still routinely refuse to encroach upon the supervision of
daily prison life. 4 7 Although, in the face of a clear constitutional violation,
modern federal courts often have abandoned this deference4 8 and invoked a
broad range of equitable remedies, 4 9 including injunctions,5 ° monetary
1O F. Supp. 285 (D. Alas. 1951); C. U.S. CONST. amend. XII, § I (exempting convicts from
the proscription against slavery and involuntary servitude).
44. See note 69 infra; notes lo8 & 187-91 infra and accompanying texts.
45. "We do not doubt the magnitude of the task ahead before our correctional systems
become acceptable and effective from a correctional, social and humane viewpoint, but the proper
tools for the job do not lie with a remote federal court. The sensitivity to local nuance, opportunity for daily perseverance, and the human and monetary resources required lie rather with
legislators, executives, and citizens in their communities." Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178,
205 (2d Cit. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). Cf. McRedmond
v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757, 766 (2d Cir. 1976) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting) ("[A] federal
judge rearranging a State's penal. . . system is like a man feeding candy to his grandchild. He
derives a great deal of personal satisfaction from it and has no responsibilit for the results.").
Supervision of the federal prison system is vested in the Attorney General of the United States. See
18 U.S.C. § 4042 (1970). See generally notes 205-07 infra and accompanying text.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1995 (1970).
47. See, e.g., Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404-05 (1974); Novak v. Beto, 453
F.2d 661, 670-71 ( 5 th Cit. I97I), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972); Queen v. South Carolina
Dep't of Corrections, 307 F. Supp. 841 (D.S.C. 1970).
48. "[Clonstitutional deprivations of the magnitude presented here simply cannot be
countenanced, and this Court is under a duty to, and will, intervene to protect incarcerated
citizens from such wholesale infringements of their constitutional rights." Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F.
Supp. 318, 328 (M.D. Ala. 1976);accord, Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 321 (972) (per curiam);
Millerv. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 865 (M.D. Fla. 19 7 5 ); c . McRedmondv. Wilson, 533 F.2d
757, 76o (2d Cir. 1976), quoting Stapleton v. Mitchell, 6o F. Supp. 51, 55 (D. Kan. 1945)
("[W]e yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human rights under the Federal
Constitution are always a proper subject for adjudication
.
). See notes 192-95 infra and
accompanying text.
49. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (197i) (school
desegregation) ("[O]nce a right and a violation have been shown, the scope of a district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in
equitable remedies."). But see Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 377 (1976). See generally Comment,
Equitable Remedies Available to a Federal Court After Declaring an Entire Prison System Violates the
Eighth Amendment, I CAP. U.L. REv. 101 (1972). Reference to a school desegregation case is not
accidental, for the experience of the federal judiciary is analogous. See generally Comment, Cruel
But Not So Unusual Punishment: The Role of the FederalJudiciary in State Prison Reform, 7 CUM. L.
REV. 31, 37-38, 57-58 (1976).
50. See, e.g., Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969) (regulation prohibiting mutual
inmate legal assistance enjoined); Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cit. 1968) (use of strap

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 29:

Page 893

S3
52
damages, 5 1 contempt citations, and even release from confinement,
the hands-off doctrine remains atmospherically important to the initial
determination of the need for as well as the degree of intervention.
In sum, the holding in Pugh can withstand the doubts cast upon it by
Rizzo and reinforced in the prison context by the traditional hands-off
approach only upon a showing that it is intrinsically different from Rizzo
either because of the strength of the precedential value of modern prison
cases, the newly developing strictures of the eighth amendment or the fact
that no other remedy is available to the court.

III.

CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT:

THE DETERMINATION OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

In order to understand the lengths traveled by the Pugh court in
fashioning the remedy, it is first necessary to advert to the breadth of the
constitutional harm found by the court. Understanding the harm in turn
requires some knowledge of the doctrinal train of events culminating in the
finding that the totality of the conditions of confinement facing prisoners
could constitute cruel and unusual punishment.
A. Three DoctrinalApproaches to Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Although the origin of the phrase "cruel and unusual punishments" is
well-established, 5 4 its original meaning has been obfuscated.

5

The com-

mon law view of the term, however, clearly did not prohibit the imposition
of brutal punishments for the commission of heinous crimes. 56
to inflict corporal punishment enjoined); Castor v. Mitchell, 355 F. Supp. 123 (W.D.N.C.
1973) (practice of awakening prisoner every 30 minutes enjoined).
51. See, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 197) (en banc), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972) (dicta) (warden's improper conduct of segregating prisoner was
proper subject of compensatory damages); Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va.
1973), enforcing 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971) (inmates deprived of constitutional rights due
to improper solitary confinement entitled to reasonable sums for cost of future medical treatment,
loss of prison wages and pain and suffering).
52. See, e.g., Landman v. Royster, 354 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1973), enforcing 333 F.
Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 197I).

53. Cf. Rhem v. Malcolm, 377 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y.), enforcing 371 F. Supp. 594
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd and remanded, 507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), on renmand, 389 F. Supp. 964
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d Cit. 1975) (ordering jail to be closed if conditions not
remedied within 3o days). See generally Note, Courts, Corrections and the Eighth Anendment: Encouraging Prison Reform by Releasing Inuzates, 44 S. CAL. L. REv. io6o (1971).
54. BRITISH DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF I688; see I W. & M. 2, c. 2 (1688).
55. See generally Granucci, "Nor Crel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted": The OriginalMeaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969).

56. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 1510-Il (T.
Cooley & J. Andrews 4 th ed. 1899): "Of these [permissible punishments], some are capital,
which extend to the life of the offender, and consist generally in being hanged by the neck till
dead; though in very atrocious crimes other circumstances of terror, pain or disgrace, are superad-
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The earliest American courts to consider the matter equated cruelty
with "something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life."" The more modern American attitude toward
cruel and unusual punishment emanates from Weems v. United States.5 8
This case involved an accessory in the falsification of a public document,
who was punished with a 12-tO-20 year sentence at hard labor with ankle
and wrist chains and the perpetual loss of civil rights. The Supreme Court
found the punishment excessive, declaring that the humanitarian leitmotiv
of the eighth amendment was not to be hampered by the common law's
traditional allowance of brutal penalties.5 9 It is also now settled that the
term "punishments" is construed to include not only statutorily imposed
sentences, but ad hoc sanctions meted out by prison officials as well. 60
ChiefJustice Burger has noted, in fact, that "[j]udicial findings of impermissible cruelty have been limited, for the most part, to offensive punishments devised without specific authority by prison officials, not by
legislatures." 6 1 Further, as exemplified in Pugh v. Locke, "punishments" is
interpreted to embrace conditions of incarceration that affect an entire
62
prison population simply as a consequence of confinement.
In recent years, courts predominantly have employed three somewhat
overlapping approaches to determine the presence of cruel and unusual
punishment: whether the punishment "shocks the conscience," whether it
is disproportionate to the offense committed and whether it is in excess of a
legitimate penajaim. 63 Each approach, however, suffers from severe
ded; as, in treasons of all kinds, being drawn or dragged to the place of execution; in high treason
affecting the king's person or government, emboweling alive, beheading, and quartering; and in
murder, a public dissection. And, in case of any treason committed by a female, the judgment is
to be burned alive. But the humanity of the English nation has authorized, by a tacit consent, an
almost general mitigation of such parts of these judgments as savour of torture or cruelty ....
Some punishments consist in exile or banishment, others in loss of liberty, by perpetual or
temporary imprisonment. Some extend to confiscation, others induce a disability. Some, though
rarely, occasion a mutilation or dismembering, by cutting off the hand or ears, others fix a last
stigma on the offender, by slitting the nostrils, or branding in the hand or cheek."
57. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (189o). "[Ijfthe punishment. . . were manifestly
cruel and unusual, as burning at the stake, crucifixion, breaking on the wheel, or the like, it
would be [unconstitutional] ....
." Id. at 446.
58.

217 U.S. 349 (1910).

59. Id. at 378 (The amendment "may be . . . progressive, and is not fastened to the
obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.").
6o. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Landman v. Royster, 333
F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. I97i), enforced, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973). But see Negrich v.
Hohn, 246 F. Supp. 173, 176 (W.D. Pa. 1965); Hill v. State, 119 Ga. App. 612, 614, 168
S.E.2d 327, 330 (1969).

61. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 384 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
62. See text accompanying notes 15-23 supra.
63. Recent Supreme Court discussions of the eighth amendment, primarily in the context
of capital punishment, include Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909 (1976) (death penalty statute
utilizing guided discretion of sentencing authority is constitutional); Furman v. Georgia, 408
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doctrinal and historical limitations that make it virtually irrelevant in the
context of an eighth amendment examination of the totality of prison
conditions. A brief description and analysis of the three approaches will
indicate why the courts that have based massive remedial measures on the
unconstitutionality of particularly abject prison conditions have abandoned these approaches in search of new ones.
i. Punishment that shocks the conscience.
The "shock the conscience" test has been the standard most extensively
applied to determine the constitutionality of particular punishments.
Pursuant to this approach, the court bases its holding of unconstitutionality on a "cry of horror" 64 at punishment that is "so foul, so inhuman and so
violative of basic concepts of decency" that it shocks the conscience of the
court. 6' This standard, which has been criticized as being overly subjective
for purposes of a constitutional test, 66 is indicative of an evolutionary
theory of punishment, without which the eighth amendment would
provide little modern protection. 67
Despite its flexibility, however, the "shock the conscience" test is
effective only when the features of confinement are so readily discernible as
to evoke predictable human affections. The value of the test diminishes
critically when such subtly effective penalties'as prison conditions that may
U.S. 238 (1972) (certain death penalty statutes result in the arbitrary infliction of capital
punishment and are unconstitutional); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971) (statute
leaving death penalty to unguided discretion of jury is constitutional; partially overruled in Gregg
v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2936 n.47 (1976)); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o (962)
(applying eighth amendment to invalidate state law criminalizing narcotics addiction); Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion) (the stigma and other harm caused by denationalization can be cruel and unusual punishment).
64. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o, 676 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
65. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 526 (2d Cir. 1967), on remand, 321 F. Supp. I27
(N.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 46o F.2d 126 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denid, 409
U.S. 885 (1972); accord, e.g., Burns v. Swenson, 4 3 o F.2d 7 71, 7 7 8 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1062 (1972) ("base, inhumane, and barbaric . . . so as to shock and offend a court's
sensibilities"); Holt v. Sarver, 3o9 F. Supp. 362, 380 (E.D. Ark. 197o), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 197t) ("shocking or disgusting to people of reasonable sensitivity"); cf. Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (conditions, to violate dictates of due process, should
offend more than some mere "fastidious squeamishness or private sentimentalism").
66. The standard allows the courts to "roam at will in the limitless area of their beliefs."
FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 6oo-oi n.4 (1942) (Black, J., concurring);
accord, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174-77 (1952) (Black, J., concurring); Adamson v.
California, 322 U.S. 46, 68-92 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting); Goldberg & Dershowitz, Declaring
the Death Penalty Unconstitutional, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1773, 1778-79 (1970).
67. Thus, the punishments chronicled by Blackstone as permissible under common law
perceptions of cruel and unusual punishment, see note 56 supra, would shock the consciences of
most judges today. See generally Robbins, Learning by Redoing, supra note so.
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affect their victims over long periods of time are involved. 'I The other
major difficulty with using this subjective test in the prison context is that
it provides no guidelines by which prison authorities might anticipate
litigation and voluntarily conform to federal constitutional standards.
Mere moral outrage by a federal judge does little to provide prison officials
with any basis for the establishment. of prison policies and standards of
confinement. 69
2.

Punishment disproportionateto the offense committed.

A,§'ecorfd, less prevalent, approach used to ascertain the presence of
cruel and unusual punishment compares the sanction imposed with the act
perpetrated to determine whether the punishment is excessive. 70 Because
68. For example, psychological extirpation, which prisons are quite capable of causing, may
involve greater anguish to the victim than many forms of corporal punishment. The Supreme
Court broached this subject in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), holding that the use of
denationalization as a punishment was barred by the eighth amendment. The Court stated that
"[t]here may be involved no physical mistreatment, no primitive torture. There is instead the
total destruction of the individual's status in organized society. It is a form of punishment more
primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the political existence that was centuries
in the development." Id. at ioi (plurality opinion per Warren, C.J.). Although the Chief Justice
was speaking only for a plurality (with Justices Black, Douglas and Whittaker), a majority of the
Court referred approvingly to these words in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See id. at
242 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 269-70 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 306 n. 1 (Stewart,
J., concurring); id. at 327 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 409 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
accord, Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 208 (2d Cir. i97) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972) ("true inhumanity seeks to destroy the psyche rather than merely the
body") (Feinberg, J., dissenting and concurring). See also I A. SOLZHENITSYN, THE GULAG
ARCHIPELAGO 1918-1956: AN EXPERIMENT IN LITERARY INVESTIGATION (1973); 2 id. (1975).
For a brief comparison of the Soviet and American prison systems emphasizing their relative uses
of psychological pressure, see Robbins, Brothers of Gulag, note io supra.
69. Perhaps the reason for this discrepancy is that we do not, and, perhaps, cannot know the
least common denominators for security or discipline or what factors can be said with certitude to
promote rehabilitation. Cf., e.g., Roberts v. Pepersack, 256 F. Supp. 415, 430-31 (D. Md.
1966), cert. dnied, 389 U.S. 877 (1967) (27 hours in isolation during which prisoner allegedly
was forced to go naked and to lie on a cold concrete floor without a mattress or blankets in
temperature of about 40 degrees and an additional 16 days of semisegregation held not to be cruel
and unusual punishment, because the inmate's violations of rules had threatened prison order).
From a different, societal, perspective, the "shock the conscience" test also suffers from the
possibility that what a lay person may consider brutal is essential for the maintenance of prison
security, discipline or the promotion of rehabilitation. As one court has noted: "Even a lifetime of
study in prison administration and several advanced degrees in the field would not qualify us as a
fidral court to command state officials to shun a policy that they have decided is suitable because
to us the choice may seem unsound orpersonally repugnant." Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178,
191 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972). See generally
Kaufman, Prison: TheJudge's Dilemma, 41 FORDHAM L. REV. 495, 508 (1973); notes 41-45 supra
and accompanying text.
7o . Dissenting in O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 337 (1892), Justice Field indicated
that excessiveness in length or severity of punishment in relation to the offense charged was of
primary significance in adjudicating violations of the eighth amendment. Id. at 339-40 (Field, J.,
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this test was developed in cases involving the trial judge's or prison
official's discretionary power in imposing specific sanctions, generally
increasing those already meted out at sentencing,7 1 it is particularly
inappropriate in evaluating ongoing conditions of confinement for the
general prison population. Challenges to a cumulation of prison conditions
that daily affect the inmate community and that do not include the
imposition of extra punishments following particular transgressions of
prison regulations cannot profitably draw on this essentially transactional
theory.
3. Punishment in excess of a legitimatepenal aim.
Under the third approach to determining the existence of cruel and
unusual punishment, a composite of the "shock the conscience" and
"excessiveness" tests, "a punishment may be cruel and unusual when,
although applied in pursuit of a legitimate penal aim, it goes beyond what
is necessary to achieve that aim; that is, when a punishment is unnecessarily cruel in view of the purpose for which it is used. "72 This standard still
considers the degree of brutality, but, having found punishment or
confinement conditions to be shocking, it compares the justification for the
punishment imposed. Government personnel have the burden of defend73
ing prison policies with reference to legitimate penal objectives.
dissenting); cf. Pervear v. Commonwealth, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475, 480 (x866) ("[W]e perceive
nothing excessive, or cruel, or unusual in this [punishment].") One writer has viewed an
"excessive or unnecessary pain" test as "the minimum content of the eighth amendment." Note,
Revival of the Eighth Amendnent: Development of Cruel-PunishinentDoctrine by the Supreme Court, 16
STAN. L. REV. 996, 1003-15 (1964). But see Gregg v. Georgia, 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2925 (0976)
(plurality opinion).
7 i. Most cases in which the courts have employed this test actually have involved imposition of the sanction of solitary confinement, a process not unlike the original sentencing in the
sense that a further punishment is exacted for a further violation. See, e.g., Landman v. Royster,
333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. '97), enforced, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. '973); Wright v.
McMann, 321 F. Supp. 127 (N.D.N.Y. 197o), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 46o F.2d 126 (2d
Cir.

1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Carothers v. Follette, 314 F. Supp. 1014

(S.D.N.Y. 1970). See generally Note, Decency and Fairness: An EmergingJudicial Role in Prison
Refornm, 57 VA. L. REv. 841, 852-55 (97').
On the application of the due process clause to prison disciplinary proceedings, see Baxter v.
Palmigiano, 96 S. Ct. i551 (976); Wolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
72. Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674, 679 (N.D. Cal. 1966); accord, Weems v.
United States, 217 U.S. 349, 371 (i9Io). See generally Packer, Making the Punishment Fit the
Crine, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1071 (1964); Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the
Substantive Crintinal Law, 79 HARV. L. REv. 635 (966).
73. In Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), for example, the court
identified "three legitimate functions of a correctional system: deterrence, both specific and
general; rehabilitation; and institutional security." Id. at 328, citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822-23 (1974). The court added that "[w]hen an inmate is restricted in a manner which
supports no such valid purpose, that restriction cannot stand." 406 F. Supp. at 328. It is worthy
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Theoretically, this burden ensures the expert presentation of objective
data, so that the court may rule on more than a purely moral or "gut
reaction" basis.
As with the other two tests, this balancing, or "punishment in excess of
legitimate penal aim" test, involves significant problems in the context of
overall prison conditions. First, it primarily addresses disciplinary sanctions, rather than the nondiscretionary toleration of conditions of confinement. Second, in the broad context of the totality of conditions facing a
prisoner, the conceptions of penal aims relied upon by this third cruel and
unusual punishment formulation become themselves so general 74 that the
expertise and objective data available in the context of more individual
punishments will not be available. The test, therefore, becomes even more
amorphous and subjective than the ones it replaces, for it then amounts to
the balancing of two imponderables: the judge's shocked conscience and
the penological justification for imprisonment. Third, although this test
might seem burdensome for the prison officials involved, in practice the
courts often defer to the officials' statements of need, rather than face the
multitude of problems involved in any general attack on prison-wide
conditions. 7' Thus, serious question exists whether this test is consonant
with the general theory of cruel and unusual punishment, 7or
whether it
6
amendment.
eighth
the
of
distortion"
"gross
a
constitutes
of note that the court overlooked the often-neglected function of punishment per se. See generally
A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS 45-5 5 (1976). After balancing
the totality of conditions of confinement against these acknowledged goals of the correctional
system, the Pugh court concluded that "[t]he conditions in which Alabama prisoners must live
• . . bear no reasonable relationship to legitimate institutional goals." 4o6 F. Supp. at 329.
At its base, the test is a derivative of the I 4 th amendment substantive due process analysis
commonly applied in prisoner cases involving first amendment rights. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 822-23 (1974) (no right to press and other media interviews). In the prison
context, see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 411 (1974) (right to correspondence without
censorship), quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968): "[A] government
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." See
gtnrally Fox, The First Amnendnent Rights of Prisoners, 63 J. CRiM. L.C. & P.S. 162 (1972); Note,
Prisom Mail Censorship and the First Anendnent, 81 YALE L.J. 87 (197 1). The standard includes a
"less drastic alternative" corollary under which living conditions are declared constitutional if
established penal goals could be attained without requiring a prisoner to live in "exacerbated
conditions of filth and discomfort." Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 792 (M.D. Tenn.
1969); accord, Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
74. With individual punishments, the question of state justification is a matter subject to
expertise and objective data. But in cases involving the totality of conditions of confinement, the
state's penological justification necessarily broadens, and the debate rarely will stop short of
questioning the very concept of prison itself, a matter clearly beyond the expertise of the courts.
Ste Robbins, Leamingq by Redoing, supra note IO; note 69 supra and accompanying text.
75. Ste gulnrally Kaufman, supra note 69.
76. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 392 (1972) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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Despite the inadequacy of these three approaches to cruel and unusual
punishments, the courts have not hesitated to use them. 77 Just as often,
however, especially of late, they have ignored them and used basically
inductive reasoning from factual findings78 in order to find that certain
particularly vile prison conditions violate the Constitution. The courts
have been more likely to use the three approaches in cases of individual
deprivations, and they have found it easiest to make the inductive leap
from the facts to a finding of unconstitutionality in cases in which the
offending conditions are systemic and widespread. The pervasiveness of
these conditions in turn often has inflated the scope of the remedy ordered
by the court. To understand those remedies it is crucial, therefore, to
analyze the prison conditions that have prompted these judicial findings of
cruel and unusual punishment.
B. Conditions of Confinement as Per Se Violations of the Eighth Amendment:
The Search for a More PracticalDoctrine
i. The "totality of conditions" approach: a first step.
Judicial holdings that conditions of confinement are per se violative of
the eighth amendment 7 9 are relatively new in the development of the cruel
and unusual punishment clause. Not only does this recent doctrinal
development threaten to replace the three traditional approaches under the
eighth amendment, at least in prison conditions litigation; it also warrants
more adventuresome remedies. The decision in Holt v. Sarver8" initiated
the new trend by holding that a cumulation of conditions might constitute
cruel and unusual punishment.
The multitude of substandard prison conditions chronicled in Holt
stands as a sordid shrine in American correctional history. 8'No other case
77. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976) (improper medical treatment);
Rozecki v. Gaughan, 459 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1972) (improper heating system); Kish v. County of
Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 9oi ( 7 th Cir. 1971) (failure to protect prisoners from assault); Landman v.
Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 197), enforced, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D. Va. 1973) (bread
and water diet); Sinclair v. Henderson, 331 F. Supp. 1123 (E.D. La. 197) (lack of exercise);
Sawyer v. Sigler, 320 F. Supp. 69o (D. Neb. 197o), aff'd, 445 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 197)
(improper medical treatment).
78. "[ilt is the very confinement itself which impermissibly contravenes the Eighth and
Foprteenth Amendment rights of the plaintiff classes." Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318? 329
(M.D. Ala. 1976);see Gates v. Collier, 5o F.2d 1291, 1300-01 ( 5 th Cir. 1974); Novak v. Beto,
453 F.2d 661, 675 ( 5 th Cir. 1971) (Tuttle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 968 (1972); Holt v. Sarver, 3o9 F. Supp. 362, 372-73 (E.D. Ark. 1970), affd,
442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 197); Hancock v. Avery, 301 F. Supp. 786, 791 (M.D. Tenn. 1969);
Commonwealth ex re. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 95-98, 280 A.2d 1io, 116-17 (197 1).
79. See cases cited in note 78 supra.
8o. 3o9 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 197o), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cit. 197).
81. Numerous legal periodicals have noted the significance of Holt. E.g., 2o DRAKE L.
REV. 188 (1971); 84 HARV. L. REV. 456 (1970); 36 Mo. L. REV. 576 (197); 3 SETON HALL L.
REV. 159 (1971); 48 TEx. L. REV. 1198 (1970); 45 TuL. L. REV. 403 (197).

May 19771

PUGH V. LOCKE

to date has portrayed such a collection of depraved conditions as those at
the Cummins and Tucker Prison Farm in Arkansas. Although the primary
significance of Holt is in the court's decision to consider prison conditions
in their totality,8 2 the extreme factual situation qualified its value for
subsequent litigation by removing the necessity of discussing minimum
constitutional standards. Moreover, the court's principal reliance upon
two particularly grievous conditions8 3 limited its precedential value in
cases involving relatively more typical prison conditions. Nonetheless, in
cursorily mentioning inadequate medical and dental facilities, 8 4 unsani8 6
tary kitchen conditions, 8 5 churlish policies regarding personal hygiene,
and an absence of rehabilitation programs8 7 as conditions that "do not rise
to constitutional dignity but which aggravate the more serious prison
defects and deficiencies," the court tentatively brought the more prosaic
conditions of confinement within the ken of eighth amendment review. 88
Although tracking its language, subsequent courts did not immediately adopt the Holt court's approach of examining the totality of
routine prison-wide conditions. Instead, they typically cited Holt in
scrutinizing the subset of those conditions that were specifically designed
for prison discipline8 9 and in cases involving unconvicted pretrial detainees in local jails. 90 Pugh v. Locke, therefore, was the first case to emulate
82. "The distinguishing aspects of Arkansas penitentiary life must be considered together.
One cannot consider separately a trusty system, a system in which men are confined together in
large numbers in open barracks, bad conditions in the isolation cells, or an absence of a meaningful program of rehabilitation. All of those things exist in combination; each affects the other; and
taken together they have a cumulative impact on the inmates regardless of their status." 309 F.
Supp. at 373.
83. Highlighting this situation were a brutal "trusty" system and open-barrack sleeping
arrangements. The Arkansas prisons primarily depended on armed inmate trusties for prison
discipline: "The reasons for penological disapproval of the use of trusty guards are that it creates
an unhealthy prison climate and atmosphere; it breeds fear and hatred between the guards, on the
one hand, and those guarded, on the other hand; it tends to be brutal and to endanger the lives of
inmates who live and work 'under the guns' of other convicts; and it leads to other abuses." Id. See
id. at 373-76. Open barracks sleeping arrangements were found to encourage sexual attacks and
other forms of violence. "The undisputed evidence is to the effect that within the last 18 months
there have been 17 stabbings at Cummins, all but one of them taking place in the barracks, and
four of them producing fatal results." Id. at 376, quoting Holt v. Sarver, 3oo F. Supp. 825, 831
(E.D. Ark. 1969).
84. 309 F. Supp. at 380.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 378-79.
88. Id. at 38o.
89. See, e.g., Novak v. Beto, 453 F.2d 661 ( 5 th Cit. 197I), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 968
(1972); Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 197o), rev'd in part, modified in part,
aff'd in part sub nom. Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cit. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
90. The conditions facing pretrial detainees raise special problems because they amount to
punishment of people who have not yet been convicted. Such conditions increasingly have been
th
found unconstitutional under the mandate of Holt. See, e.g., Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998 ( 7
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Holt's attention to the more typical and pervasive conditions that exist in
many of the prisons throughout this country. 9 1 In fact, Pugh went considerably beyond Holt both by reaching a similar result without singling out
any particularly important prison conditions 9 2 and by moving toward a
definition of the essential components of unconstitutional conditions of
3
confinement.

9

By finally concretizing the meaning of Holt in a case truly involving the
overall prison setting and carefully analyzing conditions likely to recur in
American penitentiaries, Pugh's holding that an aggregation of conditions
of confinement violates the eighth amendment poses pressing new questions for both the judiciary and the state officials subject to federal court
jurisdiction. Primary among these questions is how far the courts must go
to remedy the pervasive conditions that contribute to a finding of unconstitutionality, especially in light of the limits that federalism places on
how far they may go. Before reaching that question, however, both judges
and prison officials must determine the types, degrees and number of
prison conditions necessary to trigger the prohibition of the cruel and
unusual punishment clause. Although the answer to this question is an
equation replete with variables, 9 4 there is one constant, suggested by Pugh
Cit. 1976); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 865-67 (M.D. Fla. 1975); Rhem v. Malcolm,
377 F. Supp. 995 (S.D.N.Y.), enforcing 371 F. Supp. 594, 623 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'dandremandd,
507 F.2d 333 (2d Cir. 1974), on remand, 389 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 527 F.2d 1041 (2d
Cir. 1975); United States ex rel. Manicone v. Corso, 365 F. Supp. 576, 577 (E.D.N.Y. 1973).
See generally Note, ConstitutionalLimitationson the Conditionsof PretrialDetention, 79 YALE L.J. 94 1
(1970).
91. See note IO supra.
92. The Pugh court, for example, only superficially mentioned the conditions that primarily
motivated the decision in Holt: open dormitories, 4o6 F. Supp. at 322-23, and the fact that some
inmates performed supervisory tasks for prison personnel, id. at 325. See note 82 supra and
accompanying text.
93. Furthermore, unlike the instances of solitary confinement in which the courts frequently have employed the Holt standard, see notes 71 & 89 supra and accompanying texts, the
conditions which were'declared unconstitutional were not purposefully imposed. Rather, the
defendants claimed that the Board of Corrections was incapable of alleviating the severe situation
because of inadequate funding by the Alabama Legislature. The court responded that "a state is
not at liberty to afford its citizens only those constitutional rights which fit comfortably within its
budget." 4o6 F. Supp. at 33o; accord, Holt v. Sarver, 3o9 F. Supp. 362, 385 (E.D. Ark. 1970),
aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971): "Let there be no mistake in the matter; the obligation of the
Respondents to eliminate existing unconstitutionalities does not depend upon what the Legislature may do, or, indeed, upon what Respondents may actually be able to accomplish. If Arkansas
is going to operate a Penitentiary System, it is going to have to be a system that is countenanced
by the Constitution of the United States." See also note 23 supra.
94. For example, one federal district judge, in contrasting unsanitary toilet facilities at the
New Haven Correctional Center with those in another facility that had been declared unconstitutional in LaReau v. MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974, 977, 978 (2d Cir.. 5972), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
878 (973), confessed that "[a]s for toilet facilities, my constitutional calipers are not sufficiently
refined to distinguish between a hole in the floor, controlled by a flush mechanism outside the cell
and a bucket in the cell that a prisoner cannot empty as required." Osborn v. Manson, 359 F.
Supp. 1107, iii (D. Conn. 1973) (Newman, J.).
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and expressed elsewhere: "[T]he constitutionality of the conditions of
confinement depends both on9 5the details of those conditions and the
duration of the confinement."2.

Eleven foci of scrutiny in applying the doctrine: the second step.

A careful reading of Pugh9 6 as well as the volume of cases that have
applied Holt in the solitary confinement and pretrial detainee contexts
reveals Ii aspects of institutional management that commonly comprise
the conditions of confinement relevant to the constitutionality of a prison
system and that provided the basis for the court's order in Pugh. 9 Because
in most cases no single factor will rise to the level of a constitutional
violation, the court's remedy must address them all, as does the succeeding
analysis.
Physicalfacilities. A major amount of recent judicial scrutiny of prisons
has focused on the health and safety hazards as well as overwhelming
inconvenience and annoyance caused by inoperative equipment and other
substandard physical facilities. 9 8 In addition to conditions that threaten
imminent danger, the courts have looked at improper electrical wiring
that results in insufficient illumination, 9 9 inadequate and malfunctioning
toilet and sewage systems that pose severe health problems, 1 0 0 insufficient
95. Osborn v. Manson, 359 F. Supp. 1107, IiO (D. Conn. 1973); accord, LaReau v.
MacDougall, 473 F.2d 974 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 878 (1973); Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978
(1972); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967), on remand, 321 F. Supp. 127
(N.D.N.Y. 197o), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
885 (1972).

Although in speaking of the latter, duration element, many courts appear to refer to
conditions attendant to solitary confinement, this indicium remains relevant in scrutinizing the
overall conditions of confinement. This relevance is especially visible in light of the great weight
the courts have placed on the effect of such conditions as solitary punishment on the general
quality of prison life. See notes s io-ii infra and accompanying text.
96. For a discussion of the actual conditions found in Pugh, see text accompanying notes
14-23

Wpra.

97. See generally Prigmore & Crow, Is the Court Remaking the American Prison System?, 40
FED. PROB. 3, 5-7 (June 1976); Note, supra note 71, at 851-64.
98. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 5oi F.2d 1291, 1300 ( 5 th Cir. 1974) (exposed and frayed
wiring, lack of adequate fire fighting equipment and defective water system creating a fire
hazard); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (electrical system inadequate);
Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 872 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (lack of central sprinkling system and
limited ability, due to structural design, to evacuate jail occupants during a fire).
99. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (inadequate
lighting resulting in eye strain and fatigue).
oo. See, e.g.,

Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291,

1300 ( 5 th Cir. 1974) (sewage system

condemned by state health and pollution agencies); Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D.
Ala. 1976) (one functioning toilet for a unit housing more than 200 inmates); Miller v. Carson,
41o F. Supp. 835, 871 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (malfunctioning toilets causing unhealthy conditions);
Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 96 (N.D. Ohio), supplemented, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D.
Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972) (some inoperative
toilets and leaking sewage pipes); note 94 supra.
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washing and showering appurtenances, 10 1 and heating and ventilation
inadequacies directly attributable to decrepit facilities.102
Overcrowding. Courts, including Pugh, frequently have cited overcrowding as the one factor aggravating all other conditions of confinement and
producing the most harmful physical and mental consequences. 10 3 In
addition to exacerbating other conditions, overcrowding may be directly
responsible for the lack of a prison classification system 10 4 or failure to
protect inmates from assault by fellow prisoners. 105
Absence of a classificationsystem. The absence of a system of classifying the
inmates, in fact, is an important yardstick by which courts have measured
conditions of confinement. Establishment of such a system accomplishes
four objectives. First, it properly separates pretrial detainees from convicted offenders.' 06 Second, it segregates the physically or mentally ill
from the general inmate population.' 0 7 Third, it removes misdemeanants
and juvenile offenders from potentially destructive contact with felony
from young and weak
offenders. ' Finally, it sequesters violent inmates
09
1
abuse.
sexual
or
assault
to
prone
prisoners
Isolation and segregation cells. As noted earlier, the courts historically
have given special attention to cases involving solitary confinement. 110 In
addition, the courts since Holt have examined these special tools of prison
ioi. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 5oi F.2d 1291, 13OO (sth Cir. 1974) (80 men required to
use 3 wash basins consisting of oil drums cut in half); Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 323
(M.D. Ala. 1976) (some showers could not be turned off and continually dripped or even poured
water; no hot running water for substantial periods of time); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp.
93, 95-96 (N.D. Ohio), supplemented, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 197), aff'dsub nom. Jones
v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972) (water temperature incapable of being controlled and
sometimes scalding).
102. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (inadequate
heating and ventilation); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 872 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (fluctuating
temperatures and poor ventilation posing constant health hazard); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F.
Supp. 93, 95 (N.D. Ohio) (no ventilation), supplemented, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 197),
aff'dsub noam. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972).
103. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 322, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Miller v.
Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 873-74 (M.D. Fla. 1975); McCray v. Sullivan, 399 F. Supp. 271,
275 (S.D. Ala. 1975); note 15 supra and accompanying text.
104. See text accompanying notes I6-18 supra; text accompanying notes io6-o9 infra.
IO5. See text accompanying note 129 infra.
io6. See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 330 F. Supp. 707, 717 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'dsub
nora. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cit. 1972).
107. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 324 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Miller v. Carson,
410 F. Supp. 835, 874-75 (M.D. Fla. 1975); text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
io8. See, e.g., Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 874-75 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
IO9. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 5O1 F.2d 1291, 1308 ( 5 th Cir. 1974); Pugh v. Locke, 4o6
F. Supp. 318, 324 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
I Io. See note 71 supra and accompanying text; notes 166-70 infra and accompanying text.
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discipline as Iimportant
aspects of the more ubiquitous conditions of
confinement. 11
Medicalfacilities and treatment. The availability and quality of medical
treatment has been a key element in most judicial examinations of conditions of confinement. Although courts have considered the number of
medical personnel on call' 1 2 and the existence of adequate medical
facilities, 1 13 the actual or potential spread of contagion 1 1 4 and specific
instances of inadequate attention to physical or mental health' 15 have been
needs has been
of special concern. Moreover, deprivation of basic medical
1 16
amendment.
eighth
the
of
violative
se
per
declared
i ii. See Gates v. Collier, 5O F.2d 1291, 1304-05 ( 5 th Cit. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362, 378 (E.D. Ark. 197o), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); note 19 supra and
accompanying text.
In Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 327-28 (M.D. Ala. 1976), for example, the court
stated that "[r]he indescribable conditions in the isolation cells required immediate action to
protect inmates from any further torture by confinement in those cells. As many as six inmates
were packed in four foot by eight foot cells with no beds, no lights, no running water, and a hole
in the floor for a toilet which could only be flushed from the outside. The infamous Draper
'doghouse' is a separate building, locked from the outside, with no guard stationed inside.
Inmates in punitive isolation received only one meal per day, frequently without utensils. They
were permitted no exercise or reading material and could shower only every i i days. Punitive
isolation has been used to punish inmates for offenses ranging from swearing at guards and failing
to report to work on time, to murder."
112. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 5oi F.2d 1291, 1303 ( 5 th Cir. 1974) (medical facilities
grossly understaffed); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 876-77 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (physician
available only one-half day a week; only four nurses employed, resulting in long period of time
with virtually no medical personnel on call; no psychiatrists or psychologists available); Jones v.
Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 97 (N.D. Ohio), supplemented, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio
1971), affdsub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972) (physician available 2 or 3
afternoons a week but frequently could not be reached; dentist only occasionally available; nurse
on duty during daytime only); note ix6 infra.
113. See, e.g., Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 878 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (size of medical
clinic inadequate; equipment antiquated and useless); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 97
(N.D. Ohio), supplemented, 330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub nom. Jones v. Metzger,
456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972) (primitive health facilities).
114. See, e.g., Gates v. Collier, 5oi F.2d 1291,

1300 (5 th Cir. 1974) (inmates with

contagious diseases found in general prison population); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835,
877-78 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (inmates diagnosed with possible smallpox, chicken pox, impetigo,
infectious hepatitis, and mumps in contact with general population).
1I 5 . See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 97 S. Ct. 285 (1976); Bishop v. Stoneman, 508 F.2d
1224, 1225-1226 (2d Cir. 1974); Williams v. Vincent, 5o8 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1974); Corby v.

Conboy, 457 F.2d 251, 254 (2d Cir. 1972); Martinez v. Mancusi, 443 F.2d

921,

924

(2d Cit.

1971); United States ex rel. Hyde v. McGinnis, 429 F.2d 864, 867 (2d Cit. 1970); Pugh v.

Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 329 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 878
(M.D. Fla. 1975). See generally Robbins & Herman, Litigating Without Counsel: Faretta or for
Worse, 42 BROOKLYN L. REV. 629, 646-48 (1976).
116. See Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 329 (M.D. Ala. 1976). Prior to Pugh, the
District Court for the Middle District of Alabama had held that the lack of medical care in the
Alabama prisons violated the eighth amendment. Newman v. Alabama, 347 F. Supp. 278 (M.D.
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Food service. Courts also have focused their attention on unsanitary
kitchen facilities, 1 1 7 food handling procedures" 8 and the nutritional
content of the food itself. 119 Less frequently, courts have examined the
20
variety and quantity of the meals. 1
Personalhygiene and sanitation. Matters of hygiene and sanitation dominated the courts' concern in assessing the conditions of confinement. Any
discussion of physical facilities, 12 1 overcrowding, 12 2 medical facilities and
treatment,

12 3

food service, 1 24 and particularly isolation and segregation

cells 1 25 generally has hinged on the issue of hygiene and sanitation. With
regard to personal hygiene, the courts have looked to the availability of
Ala. 1972), aff'd in part, 503 F.2d 1320 ( 5 th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 948 (1975). The

evidence in that case showed, amongst many other horrors, that a 19-year-old with an extremely
high fever who was diagnosed as having acute pneumonia was left unobserved and allowed to take
cold showers at will for 2 days before his death; a quadriplegic with bedsores infested with
maggots was bathed and had his bandages changed only once in the month before his death; a
geriatric inmate who had suffered a stroke was made to sit each day on a wooden bench, so that he
would not soil his bed-he frequently fell onto the floor, and his legs became swollen from a lack
of circulation, necessitating the amputation of a leg the day before his death. Id. at 285. The
court entered a comprehensive order designed to remedy each specific abuse proved at trial, and to
establish additional safeguards, so that the medical program at the Alabama prisons would never
again regress to its past level of inadequacy. Id. at 286-88. But the court noted in Pugqh that at
least some of Newnman's order had not been carried out 4 years later. 4o6 F. Supp. at 33.
On the operation and management of Alabama's state mental institutions, see Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 373, 344 F. Supp. 387
(M.D. Ala. 1972), modifiedsub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (affirming constitutional "right to treatment"). See also note 204 infra.
117. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (food storage units
infested with insects; mechanical dishwashers failed to provide minimum temperature required
for sanitation).
118. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (food personnel
untrained and did not follow sanitation procedures); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 88o
(M.D. Fla. 1975) (food served and handled by uncertified corrections officers and trusties); Holt
v. Sarver, 3o9 F. Supp. 362, 380 (E.D. Ark. 197o), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971)
(unsanitary conditions attributed to trusties in charge of kitchen).
i i9. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (unwholesome
food); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 879 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (deficient diet failing to meet
nutritional needs); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 96 (N.D. Ohio), supplemented, 330 F.
Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'dsub nom. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cir. 1972)
(2000 calories per day ordered provided).
120. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (unappetizing
food); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 881 (M.D. Fla. 1975) (only two meals per day for all
inmates except trusties); Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 96 (N.D. Ohio), supplemntied,
330 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Ohio 1971), aff'd sub norn. Jones v. Metzger, 456 F.2d 854 (6th Cit.
1972) (meals qualitatively and quantitatively inadequate).
12 i. See notes 98-102 supra and accompanying text.
122. See notes 103-05 supra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 112-16 supra and accompanying text.
124. See notes 117-20 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes I io-i i supra and accompanying text.
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basic supplies for maintaining routine health and cleanliness, 12 6 while
adequate sanitation in the prison community has been measured by the
incidence of vermin 127 and general findings of filth caused by improper
128

housekeeping.
Protectionfrom violence. Inevitably, one of the more serious problems of
prison life is the repeated occurrence of violent and sexual attacks among

the prison population. Although the victim may have a cause of action for
occasional violence and sexual abuse, a prisoner now also "has a right,

secured by the eighth and fourteenth amendments, to be reasonably
protected from constant threat of violence and sexual assault by his fellow
inmates, and he need not wait until he is actually assaulted to obtain
29

relief."1
Prisonpersonnel. Courts often have cited the insufficient number and
poor quality of staff members as an important factor contributing to other
impermissible conditions by subjecting inmates to inadequate protection
and supervision. 130
Rehabilitationprograms. As a general rule, courts have not held the lack
of rehabilitation programs-educational, vocational, work, or recreational-to be per se violative of the cruel and unusual punishment
clause. 131 But recent decisions have considered this factor in evaluating the
32
overall condition of confinement. 1
126. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (no provision of
toothpaste, toothbrushes, shampoo, shaving cream, razors, or combs).
127. Sv, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (infestations of
body lice, roaches, flies, mosquitoes, and other vermin); Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 94, 28o A.2d Iio,115 (1971) (cells infested with cockroaches and rats).
128. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 323 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (Alabama's penal
institutions termed "filthy"); Miller v. Carson, 401 F. Supp. 835, 869 (M.D. Fla. 1975)
(vomitus, urine and feces on floor).
129. Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889, 890 (4th Cir. 1973);accord,Finney v. Arkansas
Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 201 (8th Cir. 1974); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 324

(M.D. Ala. 1976) (daily occurrences of robbery, rape, extortion, and assault). See generally
Plotkin, Surviving Justice: Prisoners' Rights to be Free From Physical Assault, 23 CLEV. ST. L. REv.
387 (1974).
130. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 325 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (minimum of 692
guards needed but only 383 employed); Holt v. Sarver, 3o9 F. Supp. 362, 373 (E.D. Ark.
197o), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 197) (35 "free world" personnel in charge ofalmost I,ooo
inmates).
131. E.g., Holt v. Sarver, 3o9 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. 197o), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304

(8th Cir. 197 1) ("[T]his Court knows that a sociological theory or idea may ripen into constitutional law; many such theories and ideas have done so. But, this Court is not prepared to say that
such a ripening has occurred as yet as faras rehabilitation of convicts is concerned.").
132. One of the more important aspects of Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala.
1976), is its emphasis on the absence or inadequacy of rehabilitation programs. See id. at 325-27,
330. In Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 197o), aff'd, 442 F.2d 3 04 (8th Cir. 1971),
the court developed a concept that might be called "dehabilitation": "The absence of an affirma-
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Other prisoners' rights. Most affirmative prisoners' rights claims have
raised assorted allegations of constitutional violation, including racial
segregation, 13 3 unreasonable searches and seizures, 13 4 denial of first
amendment freedoms, 135 and lack of procedural due process in disciplinary proceedings, 13 6 with the court deciding the case on other than eighth
amendment grounds. Still, violations of other constitutional guarantees
37
have contributed to ultimate findings of cruel and unusual punishment. 1
3. A consistent definition and application of the "totality of conditions"
doctrine: a step not yet taken.
Pugh, Holt and similar cases clearly point the direction of a new
doctrinal approach to eighth amendment adjudication in the prison context. They begin with the insight that the lack of a singular unconstitutional condition of confinement should not dispose of the question of a
prison's compliance with the ban on cruel and unusual punishment; the
totality of the conditions of confinement must be examined both in its
detail and, when relevant, in its duration. Next, these cases embody i I
relatively general questions that a reviewing court should ask about the
conditions of the challenged prison system focusing particularly on the
adequacy of medical treatment, hygiene, sanitation, and means of preventtive program of training and rehabilitation may have constitutional significance where in the
absence of such a program conditions and practices exist which actually militate against reform
and rehabilitation." Id. at 3 7 9;accord, Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
See notes 158-65 infra and accompanying text.
133. See, e.g., Toles v. Katzenbach, 385 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1967); Lamar v. Kern, 349 F.
Supp. 222 (S.D. Tex. 1972); United States v. Wyandotte County, 343 F. Supp. 1189 (D. Kan.
1972), rev'd, 480 F.2d 969 (ioth Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. io68 (1973); Rentfrow v. Carter,
296 F. Supp. 301 (N.D. Ga. 1968); Wilson v. Kelley, 294 F. Supp. 1005 (N.D. Ga.), affdper
curiam, 393 U.S. 266 (1968); Washington v. Lee, 263 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Ala. 1966), aff'd
meret, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
134. See, e.g., Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (1962) (seizure of conversations); Hodges
v. Klein, 412 F. Supp. 896 (D.N.J. 1976) (strip searches); Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 11o
(D. Conn. 1966) (deprivation of privacy); Moore v. People, 171 Colo. 338, 467 P.2d 50 (1970)
(seizure of items from cell).
135. See, e.g., Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (974) (right to press and
other media interviews); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (same); Procunier v. Martinez,
416 U.S. 396 (1974) (right to correspondence); Cruz ir. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (right to
exercise religion); Berrigan v. Norton, 451 F.2d 790 (2d Cit. 1971) (right to publish manuscripts); Barnett v. Rodgers, 41o F.2d 995 (D.C. Cit. 1969) (right to observe religious dietary
laws). See generally Comment, Black Muslims in Prison: OfMtalim Rites and ConstitutionalRights, 62
COLUM. L. REv. 1488 (1962). Of course, first amendment rights are not limited to speech,
assembly and religion. On prisoners' access to the courts, see, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, 97 S. Ct.
1491 (1977); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
136. See, e.g., Baxter v. Palmigiano, 96 S. Ct. 1551 (197.6); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418
U.S. 539 (1974).
137. See generally Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cit. 1971) (en banc), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
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ing violence. But having isolated these numerous and common features of
prison institutions that together may violate the Constitution, the courts
have failed to elucidate a precise formula or even reflect a clear pattern in
converting their variegated findings into eighth amendment holdings.
Nonetheless, several relatively settled conclusions may be drawn from the
doctrinal development. First, the "totality of conditions" approach, although perhaps no less elusive than the concepts of humanity and penological justification that characterized the three more traditional eighth
amendment approaches discussed earlier, 138 clearly responds more
adequately to the expansive inquiry necessitated in examining the cruelty
and unusualness of punishment in American prisons. Further, plaintiff
prisoners preparing causes of action under the eighth amendment would be
well advised to employ a multifaceted presentation to take advantage of the
fact that under the Holt-Pugh approach a combination of unsatisfactory
conditions will be more likely to succeed than will any single factor.
Finally, and most importantly, should the plaintiff succeed, the federal
district court must face the complex problem of fashioning a workable
means, within the confines of federalism, of enforcing minimal constitutional standards for conditions of confinement against a large state agency.
IV.

REMEDYING UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT:
IMPLICATIONS OF MINIMAL CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS

The federal district courts have drawn upon venerable forms of equitable relief and developed more imaginative and sweeping ones in response to
the cruel and unusual punishment clause's new application to the totality
of prison conditions. Even before Pugh advanced the "totality of conditions" approach to its logical conclusion, the availability of class actions
and the need to respond to specific unconstitutional prison conditions had
prompted a wide range of equitable responses from the courts. Under one
common injunctive technique in the prison setting, prison officials must
present the court with a plan for correcting the infirmities of the institution. 13 9 Another available method uses mediation to achieve a compromise
between standards desired by the inmates and the feasibility of their
implementation by prison administrators and personnel. 40 Courts also
138. See text accompanying notes 63-76 supra.
139. See, e.g., Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 383-85 (E.D. Ark. 197o), affd, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); SaMarion v. McGinnis, 253 F. Supp. 738, 741 (W.D.N.Y. 1966).
140. See, e.g., Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970) (entire new set of
regulations drafted after arms-length bargaining by counsel conducted under the auspices of the
court). See generally Note, Bargainingin CorrectionalInstitutions:Restructuring the Relation between the
Inmate andthe Prison Authority, 81 YALE L.J. 726 (1972). Another alternative is that of the penal
ombudsman. See generally W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN: GOVERNMENTAL
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have closed or threatened to close various institutions, 14 1 but more commonly they have preferred to retain jurisdiction over the case and to require
periodic progress reports. 142
In Pugh v. Locke, 143 however, in congruence with the wide range of
factors contributing to the holding of unconstitutionality, the federal
court interpreted its powers broadly to allow it to establish both minimum
constitutional standards and a citizen's panel to monitor and supervise all
penal reform in the State of Alabama. 14 4 Just as Pugh embodied the most
far-ranging consideration of confinement conditions in arriving at its
holding, this remedial action constituted the most expansive intrusion yet
by a federal court into the management of state penal facilities. The
remainder of this Part of the Article considers the propriety and desirability of this interposition of federal power into state prison affairs.
A. Pugh v. Locke: The Questionable ConstitutionalBases for Its Minimum
Standards
The minimum constitutional standards formulated by Chief District
Judge Frank M. Johnson in Pugh v. Locke 145 are unique in many respects.
For example, in only a few instances did the court allow prison officials
significant latitude to develop their own remedial plans for the reformation
of the Alabama prison system. 14 6 Instead, the court's standards categorically dictated not only the requisite constitutional reforms but also the
mandatory implementation method. 147 Although some of the standards
(1966); Tibbles, Ombudsmen for American Prisons,
48 N.D. L. REV. 383 (1972); Verkuil, The Ombudsman and the Limits of the Adversary System, 75
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES IN NINE COUNTRIES

COLUM. L. REV. 845 (1975).
141. See, e.g., Pugh v. Locke, 4o6 F. Supp. 318, 331 (M.D. Ala. 1976) (failure to comply

with minimum standards "will necessitate the closing of those several prison facilities"); Rhem v.
Malcolm, 389 F. Supp. 964, 966 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aff'd and remanded, 507 F.2d 1041 (2d Cit.
1975) (ordering jail closed within 30 days if conditions not remedied); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F.
Supp. 362, 383 (E.D. Ark. 197o), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cit. 1971) ("[U]nless conditions at
the Penitentiary farms are brought up to a level of constitutional tolerability, [they] can no longer
be used for the confinement of convicts.").
142. See, e.g., Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 133 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (regular
reports on efforts to comply with district court's order). In Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318, 332
(M.D. Ala. 1976), the court expressly retained jurisdiction.
143. 4o6 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
144. See text accompanying notes 24-27 supra.
145. 4o6 F. Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976).
146. Id. Compare id. with note 139 supra and accompanying text. The Pugh order mandated
that the defendants file a classification plan for all inmates, which was to correspond with
definitive guidelines established by the court. 4o6 F. Supp. at 333. The order further required the
defendants to contract with the University of Alabama Department of Correctional Psychology to
assist in the implementation of the plan. Id.
.147. 4o6"F. Supp. at 332-35.
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referred to established Supreme Court guidelines, 14 8 the court in some
instances forged new law, as in requiring that "[e]very inmate, prior to
release, . . be afforded the opportunity to participate in some transitional program designed to aid in his or her re-entry into society."' 4 9
Further, the court established and delegated extensive authority to a
39-member Human Rights Committee. 150 The court empowered the
committee to inspect records and facilities, to interview inmates and to
hire a staff. 151 But the court described the committee's function as simply
"to monitor implementation of the standards set forth in Appendix A to
15 2
this decree."
In assessing Pugh's minimum standards, it is immediately apparent
that many lack specific constitutional foundation. Even as a policy matter,
the efficacy of the measures proposed is not clear. On the one hand, the
requirement in Pugh that every inmate be furnished a storage locker and
lock'1 3 might alleviate the perennial problems of thievery among inmates
and illegal confiscation or destruction of inmate property by prison officials15 4 and, in addition, might enhance an inmate's sense of personal
dignity by providing a secure area for private possessions. '55 On the other
hand, prison authorities might argue that such a policy would encourage
the possession of contraband. 15 6 But regardless of the relative strength of
these policy arguments, in this one arguably minor but typical instance the
court clearly has moved from conventional notions of alleviation of cruel
and unusual punishment to what typically qualifies as the nonconstitutional and extrajudicial realm of prison reform. 157
148. Examples are the standards relating to disciplinary proceedings, id. at 332, citing
Wolffv. McDonnell, 48 U.S. 539 (1974), and correspondence and visitation, 406 F. Supp. at
334, citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974).
149. 406 F. Supp. at 335; see notes 158-65 infra and accompanying text.
150. 406 F. Supp. at 331.
151. Id. at 331-32. Payment for the Committee members' services and reimbursement for
travel and expenses were to be treated in the same manner as for members of the Alabama Board of
Corrections. Id. at 331.
152. Id. at 331. The court also authorized the committee to monitor implementation of the
court's earlier order in Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala.), aff'd in part, 503
F.2d 1320 ( 5 th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 928 (1975), discussed in note 116supra. The
committee was authorized "to take any action reasonably necessary to accomplish its function."
406 F. Supp. at 332.
153. 406 F. Supp. at 334.
154. See generally Robbins & Herman, supra note 115 , at 656-57 n.162.
155. See generally Schwartz, Deprivationof Privacy as a "FunctionalPrerequisite":The Case of the
Prison, 63 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 229 (1972). For judicial commentary on the inmate's privacy
right, see, e.g., Hodges v. Klein, 412 F. Supp. 896 (D.N.J. 1976) (strip searches); Travers v.
Paton, 261 F. Supp. i Io (D. Conn. 1966) (media at parole hearing).
156. See Moore v. People, 171 Co1.

338, 467 P.2d 50 (1970).

157. The Pugh standards relating to food service highlight the court's attention to arguably
nonconstitutional detail. Recently, the courts have held that the constitutional prohibition
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The court's order regarding rehabilitation provides another illustration
of its unorthodox approach to the federal judicial function. Acknowledging that "courts have thus far declined to elevate a positive rehabilitation
program to the level of a constitutional right," 15 8 thePugh court nevertheless adroitly pressed the concept of "dehabilitation" into a constitutional
mold,1 5 9 noting that the lack of such programs increases the likelihood of
future confinement and thus "defeat[s] the goal of rehabilitation, which
prison officials have set for their institutions." 1 60 Pursuant to Chief Judge
Johnson's order, prison officials must assign every inmate "a meaningful
job on the basis of [his] abilities and interests ' 161 and provide prisoners
with the opportunity to receive a basic education, participate in vocational
training programs designed to teach a marketable skill and attend a
"transitional program" prior to release. 162 The court further ordered that
every prison in Alabama employ a qualified college graduate as recreational
director and make space available for inmates to engage in hobbies. 163
Again, the outlines and detail of such programs, although perhaps
desirable, have no firm root in the Constitution. Prior to Pugh, courts had
against cruel and unusual punishment requires every inmate to be fed adequately. See, e.g.,
Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 647 (E.D. Va. I97i), enforced, 354 F. Supp. 1302 (E.D.
Va. 1973). But the Pugh court mandated three meals per day with "proper eating and drinking
utensils," a "food service supervisor for each institution" with a minimum of bachelor's level
training in "dietetics or its equivalent" and a "registered dietician" to act as a "nutrition
consultant" for the Board of Corrections, 406 F. Supp. at 334. Obviously, the eighth amendment
on its face does not address the issue of prison cuisine.
Few would doubt that the Pugh food service standards are beneficial and important. "The
inmate's food, besides providing the nutrients needed for optimum health, should be plentiful
and well served. The food service program is of fundamental importance in the maintenance of
good morale." AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STAN-

DARDS 444 (3 d ed. 1966). But it is not so clear that the eighth amendment should bar a prison
gruel that is nutritionally adequate yet monotonous in taste, color and variety, prepared by a
short-order cook and served twice daily. That is, on its face, the eighth amendment does not
prohibit gruel and unusual punishment. Note that the court later modified the order to require
two meals per day, rather than three. James v. Wallace, Civil No. 7 4-203-N (M.D. Ala., Mar.
5, 1976).
The court further ordered that "[a]ll kitchen employees shall be trained in the handling of
food and those who assist in the preparation of food shall receive training in food preparation,"
and that "[e]ach inmate who requires a special diet for reasons of health or religion shall be
provided a diet to meet his or her individual need." 4o6 F. Supp. at 334. A motion to modify this
latter requirement was denied. James v. Wallace, Civil No. 7 4 -20 3 -N (M.D. Ala., Mar. 5,
1976). See generally notes 117-20 supra and accompanying text.
No doubt some authorities would argue that any prison reform is beyond the scope of any
court's function. See note 43supra and accompanying text. See generally Comment, supra note 45.
158. 406 F. Supp. at 330. See notes 131-32 supra and accompanying text.
159. See note 132 supra.
16o. 406 F. Supp. at 330.
161. Id. at 335562. Id.
163. Id.
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gone no further than to hold that a penal system violates the eighth
amendment if it operates "in such a manner that it impedes an inmate's
ability to attempt rehabilitation, or simply to avoid physical, mental or
social deterioration."' 6 4 Thus, the Pugh requirement arguably is as much
an optimum preference as a minimum constitutional standard. 165
No aspect of conditions of prison confinement is as disconcerting as the
problem of overcrowding. 16 6 Prison officials are obliged to supervise a
burgeoning inmate population in facilities that typically are aged and
inadequate. 167 Chief Judge Johnson not only prohibited prisons from
housing additional inmates until the population did not exceed the design
capacity;' 16 he also ordered the state to furnish each resident with at least
6o square feet of living space. 169 In that this "minimum constitutional
requirement" surpasses the demands of several reform-minded model
penal standards, 17 0 it may outstrip the dictates of desirability, and surely
outdistances any past concept of "constitutional requirement."
As his order's approach to such issues as footlockers, rehabilitation and
living space indicates, Chief Judge Johnson did not hesitate to carry his
equitable remedial powers at least to the periphery both of the mandate of
the eighth amendment and of the overall role of federal judges in adjudicat164. Id. at 330, citing Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. Ark. I97O), aff'd, 442
F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
165. "[A] prison system that would be excellent from the point of view of a modern prison
administrator may not be required by the provisions of the Constitution with which the Court is
concerned." Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362, 369 (E.D. Ark. 197o), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th
Cir. 197I).

166. See notes

15 & 103 supra and accompanying texts.
167. See note xo supra.
x68. 406 F. Supp. at 332; see note 15 supra.

169. 4o6 F. Supp. at 332. The court further ordered prison administrators to equip each
isolation cell with a toilet that could be flushed from the inside and a sink with hot and cold
running water, and to meet United States Public Health Service Standards. Id. Each inmate also
was to be allowed to bathe every other day, to receive the same toilet articles and linens as
provided to the general inmate population, to have 30 minutes of outdoor exercise per day, and to
have a medical examination every third day by both a physician and a "qualified mental health
care professional." Id. The order regarding plumbing facilities was modified to the extent that
they could be omitted from some of the punitive isolation cells for the confinement of inmates
who consistently misused such facilities. James v. Wallace, Civil No. 74-203-N (M.D. Ala.,
Mar. 5, 1976). With regard to living conditions generally, inmates were to be provided with
toothbrushes, toothpaste, shaving cream, razors, razor blades, soap, shampoo, a comb, clean
clothing, bed linen, towels, beds off the floor, and clean mattresses and blankets. 406 F. Supp. at
334. A subsequent order removed shampoo from this list of personal hygiene items. James v.
Wallace, Civil No. 7 4-203-N (M.D. Ala., Mar. 5, 1976).
170. See, e.g., NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND
GOALS, CORRECTIONS 34 (1973) (inmate's cell should be of"adequate size"); NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, A MODEL ACT FOR THE PR6TECTION OF RIGHTS OF
PRISONERS, § I, at 15 (1972) ("not less than fifty square feet of floor space in any confined

sleeping area").
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ing claims against state agencies. Yet, because he used the "totality of
conditions" approach, which bases the right to relief on a conglomeration
of i i considerations, Chief Judge Johnson was forced into adopting a
remedy that responded to all i i considerations-a remedy that inevitably
would be far ranging. It may seem ironic, nonetheless, that inmateplaintiffs who are unable to make out a constitutional cause of action based
on any one prison condition in effect may receive the same relief as if they
had made out and succeeded on ii such claims; it only adds to the irony that
such inmates also may be entitled to a plethora of remedies that require
significantly more intensive and constitutionally less obvious forms of
federal court supervision over state agencies than the remedies available
under any one such claim would require.
One answer to this argument is that insofar as the eighth amendment's
ban on cruel and unusual punishment covers the totality of prison conditions, the remedy for violations of that ban necessarily must intrude in that
same totality. Moreover, for at least two reasons, the remedy probably will
not succeed unless it attempts significantly and quite specifically to cure each
of the i i offending conditions, even if, theoretically, a slighter improvement on all i i fronts would have removed the constitutional infirmity of
the overall conditions of confinement. First, an effort at piecemeal or
modest improvement in conditions is not likely to result in an overall
improvement; ordering resources shifted to repair the leaking plumbing in
one cellblock simply may result in neglect of the plumbing problems in
other cellblocks. Further, in an effort to avoid overly detailed guidelines, a
court order often may succumb to vague and overly broad principles of
conduct that are easily ignored, evaded or misconstrued. Despite the lack
of an immediately apparent constitutional basis, therefore, the remedy for
a "totality of conditions" violation of the eighth amendment may have to
exceed in scope and detail the sum of the remedies for any individual
condition's violation.
B. Answering the Federalism Critique of FederalJudicial Supervision of State
Penal Administration
Even assuming the constitutional propriety of the degree of constitutional relief afforded in Pugh, Rizzo v. Goode17 1 suggests that the federalism
concerns may remove the power of thefederalcourts to afford that relief. In
fact, on the basis of its ambitious remedy, Pugh at first appears to be a
prime candidate for reversal under the federalism policy of Rizzo. Certainly
the Pugh court's order is far more intrusive than the one overturned in
Rizzo, which merely ordered the Philadelphia Police Department to draw
171. 423 U.S. 362 (1976), discussed in text accompanying notes 35-40 supra.
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up certain guidelines and submit them to the court. 1 72 Indeed, the Pugh
standards are so detailed that they preclude any significant input on the
part of prison officials. 173 Moreover, Pugh, like Rizzo, involved federal
court intervention in certain internal affairs of a state agency that typically
have been subject to a judicial "hands off' policy. 174
But Pugh may present a different case than Rizzo, one in which the
constitutional violations might particularly warrant federal adjudication
and relief, 17 1 in part because the violations are both more pervasive and
more difficult to remedy. 176 The Rizzo petitioners were citizens complaining of police abuses, which, although offensive and occasionally dangerous, 177 did not immediately jeopardize life and limb. More importantly,
perhaps, the citizens of Philadelphia had recourse to the ballot or, failing
that, to their right to relocate to rid themselves of their tormentors. The
inmates of the Alabama state prisons, on the other hand, not only lacked
any potential control over, but were entirely controlled by, the objects of
their complaints and could look only to the courts for relief. The Pugh
standards should not be judged, then, in terms of whether any judicial
intervention was called for but in terms of whetherfederal intervention and
intervention in this particular Jorm are the least restrictive alternatives
available for dealing effectively with these abuses. If they are, then, just as
in other areas of established federal court interventionism such as the
school desegregation cases, 17 8 principles of federalism may not prevent
federal judicial correction of unconstitutional state action.
The striking parallels between the Pugh court's order and the one in a
recent instance of federal judicial action in the desegregation area-Morgan
v. McDonough 179 , the South Boston High School case--suggest that at
172. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
173. See text accompanying notes 145-7osupra.
174. See text accompanying notes 44-45 supra.
175. Cf. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974); Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225, 242 (1972) (federal courts are primary fora for vindicating federal civil rights).
176. The need for federal relief may be especially powerful in cases involving massive
challenges to statewide prison systems that often result in high state officials being named as
defendants. See text accompanying note 12 supra. Moreover, because local, often elected, judges
might fear the political obloquy associated with such remedies as closing down prisons or ordering
the expenditure of more public resources on them, and, by virtue of their sentencing authority,
might have an institutional concern for not rocking the state's penal boar, they may not provide as
adequate an alternative source of judicial protection. See generally Bartels, supra note 34, at 30
n.9.
177. Council of Orgs. on Phila. Police Accountability and Responsibility v. Rizzo, 357 F.
Supp. 1289, 1294 n.316 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'dsub nom. Goode v. Rizzo, 5o6 F.2d 542 (3 d Cit.
1974), rev'd, 423 U.S. 362 (5976). The district court made findings of fact concerning over 30
allegations of specific instances of misconduct by the police.
178. See, e.g., note 31 supra; notes 179-85 infra and accompanying texts.
179. 540 F.2d 527 (ist Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 743 (1977).
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least in some cases a relatively intrusive form of intervention in state prison
systems is equally necessary in state school systems. 1 80 In affirming the
district court's decision to place the school in receivership, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals in Morgan noted the lack of cooperation given by school
officials to the court's initial desegregation order. 18 1 Similarly, in 1972,
the Federal District Court for the Middle District of Alabama had entered a
detailed decree ordering that Alabama prisoners be provided adequate
medical care. 18 2 Yet 4 years later, the Pugh court noted that 70 percent of
the prison population required some kind of psychiatric treatment and that
"nothing has been done to alleviate this situation." 1 83 The two cases also
resemble each other in terms of the actual remedies chosen in response to
their similar histories of noncompliance with constitutional dictates. In
Morgan, the court of appeals warned that "the principal alternative to the
184
receivership order was to order that South Boston High be closed."
Chief Judge Johnson in Pugh also saw closing the prisons as the principal
alternative to dictating the standards under which the prisons may con18
tinue to operate. S
The crux of this aspect of the problem, then, is whether that assessment
was correct, or whether some less intrusive measure might have rectified
that situation as well. The most obvious solution, of course, is the
traditional order to state officials to draft a plan for improving conditions in
the state institutions. 18 6 Although a plan of this type was invalidated in
Rizzo, such a plan has fewer federalism deficiencies than the more intrusive
Pugh and Morgan approaches because it leaves state personnel considerable
control. It also comports better with the policy behind the "hands off"
doctrine by relying on the presumed expertise of local prison adminisi8o. Education, no less than the police affairs involved in Rizzo and the prison affairs
involved in Pugh, see text accompanying note 174 supra, is an area of traditional state supremacy
and discretion. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 402-03 (1923).
181. 540 F.2d at 533-34. The litigation has been protracted indeed. In 1974, the School
Committee was enjoined from discriminating on the basis of race in the operation of the Boston
Public Schools and was ordered to formulate and implement plans to secure the plaintiffs'
constitutional rights. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass.), affd, 509 F.2d 580
(ist Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (i975). This order was augmented by one concerning
faculty hiring practices, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 388 F. Supp. 581 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d
431 (ist Cir. 1976), another concerning the desegegation plan, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F.
Supp. 216 (D. Mass.), stay of implementation pending appeal denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1976), and a
third placing a public high school in receivership, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 409 F. Supp. i 141 (D.
Mass. '975), aff'dsub nom. Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527 (Xst Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97
S. Ct. 743 (1977)182. Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
183. 406 F. Supp. at 324.
184. 540 F.2d at 534i85. 4o6 F. Supp. at 331.
i86. See note i39 supra and accompanying text.
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trators rather than inexpert federal judges. 1 87 Nonetheless, having
achieved the disappointing results noted above in using this approach in
attacking inadequate medical care in the Alabama prisons, 188 Chief Judge
Johnson was justified in rejecting it in Pugh. Moreover, by establishing the
Human Rights Committee, he actually adopted an intermediate approach
that still leaves much of the supervision and implementation of the decree
in the hands of local officials 189 while laying down specific guidelines that
must be met. Given Chief Judge Johnson's unsatisfactory experience with
the less intrusive approach of reliance on Alabama prison officials, the
Human Rights Committee provides an imaginative and workable accommodation between the principles of federalism and the need for protection
of constitutional rights.
The Human Rights Committee also helps answer the related lack-ofexpertise objection to federal judicial intervention in prison affairs. The
order in Pugh ensured the Committee a qualified staff' 9 ° and authority to
"engage and consult appropriate, independent specialists."'191 To be sure,
the formation and functioning of such a panel may prove to be unwieldy
and expensive in practice. But when the situation requires continued
oversight to guarantee compliance with the court order, an expert committee composed of members of the local community surely must be preferable
to a lone federal judge with little or no experience in prison administration.
Furthermore, the federal intervention in Pugh seems just as proper as
the dramatic form of its intervention, because prison officials in such states
as Alabama have failed consistently to carry out their eighth and 14 th
amendment obligation to eschew cruelly-and -unusually punishing the
inmates in the prisons they control. 192 Try as they might, state officers
constitutionally may not hide behind the federalism principles in Rizzo or
187. See, e.g., Muniz v. United States, 305 F.2d 285, 287 (2d Cir. x962) (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he decision in this case will force the lower courts to substitute their judgment of
what constitutes 'reasonable' behavior in the delicate area of prison administration for that of the
persons charged by statute with the duty of running our correctional system."); notes 41-53 supra
and accompanying text.
188. See note 116 supra.
189. Among the Committee members were representatives of the clergy, the professions
and academia. See 4o6 F. Supp. at 336-37.
19o. See note 151 supra and accompanying text.
191- 406 F. Supp. at 331-32.
192. The I 4 th amendment, which underlies most of the litigation discussed in this Article,
forbids a state to "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law."
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this clause to
require that the states fulfill most of the obligations towards citizens that the Bill of Rights
imposes on the federal government. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 147-58 (1968). This
requirement on the states includes the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the eighth
amendment. See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 66o, 666 (1962).
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even in the ioth amendment 19 3 to avoid this or any other "obligation
imposed upon them by the Constitution of the United States," 19 4 nor "to
frustrate or ignore the mandates of the Constitution."' 9' It is precisely in
such circumstances as these that the federal courts must serve as the
" 'primary and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the
Constitution, the laws and treaties of the United States.' "196 In the words
of one federal appellate judge:
I look forward to the day when the State and its political subdivisions will again take
up their mantle of responsibility. . . and thereby relieve the federal Government of
the necessity of intervening in their affairs. Until that day arrives, the responsibility
for this intervention must rest with those who through their ineptitude and public
19 7
disservice have forced it.
193. Yet state officials frequently have proffered the ioth amendment's residuum of state
powers as a defense to the exercise of federal jurisdiction over actions alleging state violations of
federal constitutional rights. See Johnson, The Constitution and the FederalDistrictJudge, 54 TEx.
L. REv. 903, 914 (1976) (article by Chief Judge Johnson).
194. Id. (emphasis deleted).
195. Id.
196. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 464 (1974) (opinion for the Court by Justice
Brennan), quoting F. FRANKFURTER & J. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 64
(1928). But see Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 9o HARv. L.

REV. 489 (1977).
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), provided that complaints against state agencies
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) generally could be prosecuted without prior resort to a state
judicial remedy, unless the state has commenced or is about to commence on its own criminal or
quasicriminal action against the federal complainant. See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (I975); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (I97 1).See generally Bartels, supra note 34.
Dicta in Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), however, suggest that the scope of relief
obtainable from the federal courts against state officials may be narrower than that available in
state courts. Id. at 378-8o. Although the principles of federalism discussed in Rizzo may aggravate problems of judicial intervention, they caution federal restraint, and qualify the broad
holding in Monroe, at the very least, only when adequate relief is available from state courts
dedicated to upholding and enforcing the eighth amendment. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
174 (1961) (purpose of Congress in enacting § 1983 was "to provide a federal remedy where the
state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not available in practice"). In light of the persistent
failure of many states' courts to face up to the eighth amendment problems inherent within the
prison systems of those states, the basic prerequisite for federal restraint is unfulfilled in prison
conditions cases.
197. Dent v. Duncan, 36o F.2d 333, 337-38 ( 5 th Cir. 1966) (Rives, J., concurring
specially); see Mason, Judicial Activism Old and New, 55 VA. L. REV. 385, 408 (1969); Cf
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO POST-CONVICTION REMEDIES 2 (Approved Draft, 1968) (improved

state postconviction remedies would help alleviate federalism problems caused by current need to
resort to federal habeas corpus for relief). One commentator has written in terms of the realities of
our political process that "the Alabama Federal Intervention Syndrome . . . is the tendency of
many state officials to punt their problems to the federal courts. Many federal judges have grown
accustomed to allowing state officials to make political speeches as a prelude to receiving the order
of the district court. This role requires the federal courts to serve as a buffer between the state
officials and their constituencies, raising the familiar criticism that state officials rely upon the
federal courts to impose needed reforms rather than accomplishing them themselves." McCor-
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Two other criticisms of federal judicial action often characterize
federalism attacks on judicial interventionism: that such activism encourages potential inmate-plaintiffs to add their cases to already overburdened
federal court dockets 198 and that it discourages activity by legislators who
arguably are more qualified to achieve systematic prison reform. 199 The
methods adopted by the Pugh court actually turn these supposed disadvantages of interventionism into advantages in the context of prison condition
litigation by fostering judicial economy and providing an incentive for
state officials to begin prison reform themselves.
By addressing unconstitutional conditions of confinement cumulatively and by employing committees to supervise their orders, the federal
courts could function without unduly encumbering their time and energies. Traditionally, the courts have relied on case-by-case adjudication of
individual prisoner complaints and on remedies limited to a particular
plaintiff and very specific constitutional imperfections, in order to accomplish eighth amendment goals. But recently these complaints have accelerated in number beyond easily manageable levels. 2 0 0 By following the Pugh
approach, however, courts can order a comprehensive program for remedying the totality of unconstitutional conditions. A Human Rights Committee, moreover, can provide an ongoing forum for inmate grievances without directly burdening the judicial process. 2 0 ' Such a committee might
even offer a remedy mechanism for the investigation and disposition of2the
02
claims of those prisoners who prefer to petition the court for redress.
mack, The Expansion of FederalQuestion Jurisdictionand the PrisonerComplaint Caseload, 1975 WIs.L. REV. 523, 536 (footnotes omitted). See Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971)
(en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
198. See generally McCormack, supra note 197.
199. See L. GOLDBERG & E. LEVENSON, LAWLESS JUDGES 9-11 (1935); Bickel, Is the
Warren Court Too "Political"?, in THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN 2 16, 2 18-19,
221-22 (L. Levy ed. 1972), reprintedfrom N.Y. Times, Sept. 25, 1966, § 6 (Magazine), at 30.
200. See generally McCormack, supra note 197. Typically, these complaints are instituted
without the assistance of counsel. For a discussion and analysis of post-convictionpro se litigation,
see Flannery & Robbins, The Misunderstood Pro Se Litigant: More than a Pawn in the Game, 41
BROOKLYN L. REV. 769 (1975); Robbins & Herman, supra note 115; Zeigler & Hermann, The
Invisible Litigant: An Inside View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U. L. REv. 157
(1972).
201. Commentators have argued that informal and ongoing dispute solving mechanisms
may have advantages over traditional judicial hearings in solving certain types of disputes,
including, for example, those between students and teachers. See, e.g., Kirp, Proceduralismand
Bu'naucray:Due Process in the School Setting, 28 STAN. L. REV. 841, 864-70 (1976). Nonetheless,
some inmates, of course, would wish to go directly to court, perceiving it as "the one institution
specifically designed for the vindication of the individual's constitutional rights." Flannery &
Robbins, supra note 20o, at 77 1. But the availability of another forum would reduce the burden
on the federal courts at least to some extent.
202. "[O]ne of the most effective methods of attaining standards and achieving goals is to
add to them mechanisms for their enforcement." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMI-
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The activist trend of judicial supervision manifested in Pugh also should
induce legislative and administrative action to remedy undesirable conditions of prison confinement. The Governor of Missouri, for example,
recently signed into law legislation increasing state payments to county jail
facilities, because "[f]ederal court decisions in Missouri have made it clear
must be
that under our United States Constitution certain jail standards
20 3
changes."
necessary
order
may
courts
met; otherwise, the
In sum, despite the precariousness of its constitutional bases and the
enormity of its federal judicial involvement in state penal affairs, the
remedy afforded in Pugh v. Locke represents a well-conceived and least
intrusive means of effectively bringing a degree of order, sanitation, rehabilitation, and basic livability to state prisons. Moreover, that remedy
may serve as the only means of effectively enforcing the eighth amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment as embodied in the developing "totality of prison conditions" doctrine. Because that doctrine, in
turn, provides the only viable analytical approach to assuring that prison
confinement-the most common punishment meted out to serious offenders by the states' criminal justice systems-is not cruel and unusual, the
Pugh remedy may follow inexorably from a commitment seriously to
pursue the mandate of the eighth amendment in the prison setting.
V.

CONCLUSION

The uniqueness and importance of Chief Judge Johnson's decision in
Pugh v. Locke, as well as its uncertain precedential value, lie in its unabashed willingness to carry eighth amendment doctrine and federal
NAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, supra note 170, at 5; see note 140 supra and accompanying

text.
203. Kansas City Star, June 23, 1976, at 3 A, col. 3. See id., May 31, 1976, at 18, col. ii
(discussing Pugh decision); c. Comment, Judicial Activism in Tort Reform: The Guest Statute
Exemplar and a Proposalfor ComparativeNegligence, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1566, 1592-94 (1974)
(judicial activism is proper where legislative action is unlikely due to the lack of any "articulate
pressure group"').
Of course, federal court instigation of state penal reform provides no guarantee that changes
will be either substantive or permanent. For example, 5 years after the original Holt v. Sarver case,
3oo F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Ark. 1969), supplemented, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd,
442 F.2d 304 (8th Cit. 1971), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed in part
a lower court order releasing the Arkansas prison system from active judicial supervision, stating:
"Based on the overall record before us, it is our firm conviction that the Arkansas correctional
system is still unconstitutional. We are fully cognizant of the considerable progress which has
been made by the Board of Correction with the minimal resources at hand. However, we confront
a record and factual history of a sub-human environment in which individuals have been confined
under the color of state law. The effort to make some amelioration of those conditions will simply
not suffice." Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 215 (8th Cit. 1974) (emphasis
in original).
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remedial involvement in state penal affairs far beyond the traditional
bounds of conditions-of-confinement adjudication. 20 4 By that willingness, Pugh v. Locke challenges traditional views of the legal system itself:
that the federal judiciary should not participate in what are essentially state
affairs 20 5 and that judges should hesitate to make decisions that call for
political judgments 20 6 or administrative expertise. 20 7 But, as the preceding analysis argues, even these principles occasionally must give way to the
reality of intransigent opposition among state officials who have neglected
or refused
to correct unconstitutional or unlawful state policies and prac208
tices.
The order in Pugh also challenges an even more basic tenet of the legal
system that underlies the ones discussed above: that the powers of government should be separate and distinct. 209 In particular, the judicial intervention exemplified by the remedy in Pugh raises the question of whether
taking remedial action that approaches running a state prison system is a
proper role for any judiciary, state or federal. Justice Harlan neatly
summed up the problem when he spoke of the role of the Supreme Court:
From the beginning. . . two views as to the proper role of the Supreme Court in,
our governmental system have existed ....
The one [view] is that the Court should stand ready to bring about needed basic
changes in our society which for one reason or another have failed or lagged in their
accomplishment by other means.
The other [view] is that such changes are at best left to the political process and

204. Pugh is the product of one of the more liberal and creative judges on the federal bench.
Chief Judge Johnson's proclivity for establishing minimum constitutional standards is evident in
other areas of the law. These areas include the operation and management of the facilities
maintained by the Alabama Department of Mental Health for the mentally ill and mentally
retarded, Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 197 I), enforced, 344 F. Supp. 37 3 and
344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), modified sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (sth
Cir. 1974) (affirming constitutional "right to treatment"), and the operation and management of
medical care facilities available to prisoners in the Alabama penal system, Newman v. Alabama,
349 F. Supp. 278 (M.D. Ala. 1972), affdinpart, 503 F.2d 1320 (sth Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 948 (1975), discussedin note 116supra. For an interesting biographical article on Judge
Johnson, see Wall St. J., Apr. 15, 1976, at I, col. I.
205. See U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers nor delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people."
206. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 170 (1803). But see Eakin v.
Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawl. 330, 348 (Pa. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting); A. DE TOcQUEVILLE,
DEMocRACY IN AMERICA 28o (P. Bradley ed. 1945) ("[Slcarcely any political question arises in
the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial question.").
207. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 393 U.S.
129, 136-37 (1968); notes 45, 69 supra and accompanying texts. ChiefJudge Johnson expressed
this view in Johnson, supra note 193.
208. See, e.g., notes 181-83 supra and accompanying text.
209. See THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47, 48 (J. Madison).
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should not be undertaken by judges who, as they should be because of their office, are
beyond the reach of political considerations .... 210

This admonition that courts should avoid the "political thicket ' 2 1 1 comes
too late, however, for constitutional courts have been firmly entrenched in
that sphere since Marbury v. Madison. 2 12 Chief Justice Marshall himself

stated that he did not want to be remembered either for having sought "to
enlarge the'judicial power beyond its proper bounds" 221314 or for having

"feared to carry it to the fullest extent duty required."The question then becomes one of defining the proper bounds of
judicial activity as determined by the "duty required." Surely the duty to
interpret and enforce the Constitution looms large in the obligations of all

courts, state or federal. 21 5 But that calls for some degree of certainty about
210. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Dec. 18, 1967, at 36. Rather dolefully, Justice
Harlan's speech at Princeton University concluded that "[t]here can be little doubt but that the
former, broader role of the [federal courts] is the one currently in vogue, and that it is resulting in
" Id.
the accomplishment of basic changes in governmental relationships ....
211. See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
212. 5 U.S. (i Cranch) 137,(1803) (Marshall, C.J.). See Mason, stpra note 197, at 386.
This aspect of the courts' decisionmaking is not free of criticism, of course. One interesting source
of commentary on judicial activism is the judiciary itself, usually in dissenting opinions, even
though "[e]very Justice has been accused of legislating and everyone has joined in that accusation
of others." R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT So
(1963). See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v: Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc., 415 U.S. 394,
419 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The [Court's] result reads the Copyright Act out of
existence. . . .That may or may not be desirable public policy. But it is a legislative decision
that not even a rampant judicial activism should entertain."); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218, 25o (1967) (Black, J., dissenting in part) ("I . . . feel that we are deciding what the
Constitution is, not from what it says, but from what we think it would have been wise for the
Framers to put in it. That to me [is] 'judicial activism' at its worst.").
213. Letter from John Marshall to Joseph Story, October 12, 1831, quoted in 4 A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 522 (1919).
214. Id.

215. See, e.g., Marbuty v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (Marshall, C.J.)
("[I]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.");
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703-05 (1974); Speech of ChiefJustice Hughes before the
Elmira Chamber of Commerce, Elmira, N.Y., May 3, 1907, in C. HUGHES, ADDRESSES OF
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 1906-1916, at 179, 185 (2d ed. 1961) ("[T]he Constitution is what

the judges say it is"). In Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (I9IO), an eighth amendment
cruel and unusual punishment case, see notes 58-59 supra and accompanying text, the Supreme
Court stated: "The function of the legislature is primary, itsexercises fortified by presumptions of
right and legality, and is not to be interfered with lightly, nor by any judicial conception of their
wisdom or propriety. They have no limitation . . . but constitutional ones, and what those are
the judiciary must judge." Id. at 379.
The judge's power and duty to interpret and enforce the law is also the power and duty to
create it. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230, 232
("[Clourts have a creative job to do when they find that a rule has lost its touch with reality and
should be abandoned or reformulated to meet new conditions and new moral values."). Contrary
to the theoretical aspirations of some preeminent jurisprudents, see, e.g., Hart, The Supreme Court,
1958 Term, Foreword: The Tine ChartoftheJustices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84 (959); Pollack, Racial
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just what the Constitution requires. As noted above, 2 1 6 the concept of
"cruel and unusual punishment" is a difficult and changing one. On the
one hand, its definition might better be left to the legislators, who are,
after all, duly elected and presumably in closer touch with contemporary
definitions of "cruelty." On the other hand, the eighth amendment
arguably was intended to guard against precisely this sort of popular
sovereignty that so easily may lead to excesses against a disfavored few. But
the question is moot in cases like Pugh, in which prison conditions prompt
admissions of unconstitutionality from all who review them, including the
state's own defense counsel. 2 1 7 Unfortunately, many other state prison
systems have not yet reached the point where the initial determination of
unconstitutionality is in much dispute. In such states, the question ofwho
should interpret the terms of the eighth amendment is considerably less
important.
Given a finding of unconstitutionality, some individual or group of
individuals must develop and implement a remedy. Again, some question
arises as to the branch of government best fitted for the task; in this case,
the choice is between the executive and the judiciary. Courts may be wise
to allow prison officials to draft their own plans, reserving a supervisory
role for the judiciary. If such an attempt has been made with unsatisfactory
results,218 however, courts may have no alternative but to devise the plans
themselves. In sum, the question of whether any court should intervene in
the administration of a penal system may be answered by default.
Resolution of the questions presented by Pugh v. Locke will be difficult.
Terms like "equilibrium," "duty," "rights," and "proper bounds" come
easily and frequently to mind, but they are less easily and certainly less
frequently defined. 219 The Pugh approach comes down on the side of
Discrinination andJudicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, lo8 U. PA. L. REV. I (1959);
Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. I (1959), there can
be no constitutional interpretations in a system of logic that "has no value for its own sake." A.
Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF REFORM 22

(1968); see Miller & Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 27 U. CHI. L.
REV. 66i (196o). Because the law deals with human conduct, it must meet changing and
changeable human needs and expectations. See A. Cox, supra at 22. Even the Supreme Court has
recognized the extreme mutability of supposedly immutable truths, writing that "[tlime works
changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes," Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
349, 373 (i91O), and, in the context of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, the Court has
built this malleability into the law by focusing on the "evolving standards of decency." Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, lOI (1958) (emphasis added).
2 16. See notes 64-78 supra and accompanying text.
217. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
218. See text accompanying notes 182-83 supra.
219. See B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 28 (192 1) ("[N]othing is

stable. Nothing Is absolute. All is fluid and changeable. There is an endless 'becoming.' ");
Robbins, The Adnissibility of Social Science Evidence in Person-OrientedLegal Adjudication, 50 IND.
L.J. 493, 5oS - 1 6 (1975)-
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sweeping federal intervention as a last, but viable, resort. It presents
public policymakers with a distinct and difficult choice: Correct unconstitutional conditions of prison confinement at significant cost to the state
government 220 or place the responsibility in the hands of the federal
judiciary and effectively lose control over the management and resource
allocation of the state prisons. Thus, Pugh v. Locke serves notice that unless
and until the states are prepared to recognize the latent imperfections of
their correctional systems, the federal courts may be compelled to take the
initiative in charting the perimeters of a maturing society.
220. "The question is not whether the courts ought to intervene-they will continue to do
so anyway, in some degree-but how correction[s] can strengthen its position against undesirable
expansion of court supervision. If the profession evaluates itself candidly, shapes its practices to
accord with the highest standards of fairness in its own tradition, and succeeds in communicating
the reasons for its practices and the constructive approach being taken, the chances are great that
courts will generally leave to correction[s] the freedom of action that has always been its
hallmark." Kimball & Newman,Judicial Intervention in CorrectionalDecisions: Threat and Response,
14 CRIME & DELINQ. I, 13 (1968).

